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HOW CIRCUITS CAN FIX THEIR SPLITS 
WYATT G. SASSMAN* 
The desire to avoid conflicts between the regional circuits of the federal 
courts of appeals, commonly known as “circuit splits,” has had an immense 
influence on the structure and operation of the federal appellate courts for 
roughly a century.  Over time, the Supreme Court has been assigned 
responsibility for resolving these conflicts.  Yet as overall federal caseloads 
have increased, this reliance on the Supreme Court has imposed serious and 
well-recognized burdens on the operation of the federal courts.  For decades 
scholars have debated bold proposals to address these problems, such as 
creating a new national court dedicated to resolving conflicts or fundamentally 
restructuring the Supreme Court.  This Article offers a straight-forward yet 
transformational proposal overlooked in these debates: let the courts of 
appeals resolve their conflicts on their own.  
This Article argues that the federal courts of appeals should resolve circuit 
splits on their own, rather than rely on the Supreme Court, and lays out how 
they could do so.  A judge-made doctrine known as the “law of the circuit” 
prohibits a later panel of a court of appeals from revisiting an earlier panel’s 
decision, even when the earlier decision has resulted in a conflict with another 
circuit.  Because practically all work in the courts of appeals is done by three-
judge panels, the law of the circuit doctrine has the effect of locking conflicts 
in place—the first circuit to address an issue cannot confront the reasons that 
motivated a latter circuit to come to a different conclusion.  Instead, every 
circuit gets one chance to weigh in and, as a practical matter, no circuit can 
ever resolve the conflict. 
I therefore propose relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine when a circuit’s 
prior decision has resulted in a conflict with another circuit.  This proposal is 
narrowly tailored, identifying tools already in use in some courts of appeals 
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  I thank Brian Wolfman, 
Robin West, David Super, Erica Hashimoto, Sam Kamin, Nancy Leong, Alan Chen, Justin Marceau, 
Rebecca Aviel, Bernard Chao, Viva Moffat, and Danielle Jefferis for comments and support on this 
project.  I also thank participants in workshops at Georgetown University Law Center, LSU’s Paul M. 
Hebert Law Center, and the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  All mistakes remain my 
own, and the views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of my current, past, or 
future clients or employers.  © Wyatt G. Sassman 2020. 
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that would allow them to relax the doctrine and revisit a prior decision, but 
only where that prior decision has subsequently resulted in a conflict with 
another circuit.  This creates the opportunity to address the conflict without 
Supreme Court intervention while maintaining the existing doctrine’s benefits 
in the vast majority of the court of appeals’ cases.  Yet the proposal is also 
transformational, fundamentally changing the relationship between the federal 
appellate courts by empowering the courts of appeals to engage in dialogue 
with each other and reducing reliance on the Supreme Court.  This Article 
therefore offers a realistic proposal for achieving important structural and 
institutional improvements in the federal courts at a lower cost and with less 
disruption than existing proposals.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts in the interpretation of federal law between two regional circuits 
of the federal courts of appeals—commonly known as “circuit splits”—have 
vexed the federal courts for well over a hundred years.  The desire to avoid 
these conflicts and maintain uniformity in federal law is so strong that it has 
changed the very structure of our federal courts, earned the attention of 
congressional committees, and occupied countless hours of study.1  For decades 
we have relied on the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts among the courts of 
appeals.  Yet over time, the caseloads of the lower federal courts have ballooned 
while the Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk such that most now doubt the 
Supreme Court’s capacity to meaningfully maintain uniformity in the lower 
courts by resolving conflicts.2  This problem has generated proposals of 
remarkable scope, such as creating a new national court dedicated to resolving 
conflicts or fundamentally changing how the Supreme Court works.3  This 
Article offers a proposal that this literature has overlooked: let the circuits fix 
their own splits.    
Consider, for example, that a different Voting Rights Act applies in Georgia 
than in Tennessee because of a conflict between the Sixth Circuit and Eleventh 
Circuit.  In 2000, the Sixth Circuit decided that there is no private right of action 
to enforce a section of the Act that says states cannot prohibit a person from 
voting because the person omitted information on their voter registration form 
that was not material to their eligibility to vote.4  The appeal was brought pro 
se by a Tennessee resident who felt that he should not have to provide his Social 
Security number in order to register to vote.5  The Sixth Circuit rejected his 
 
1. Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals: A 
Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 395, 396 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, Generation Spent]. 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 473, 475 (1973). 
4. McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B)).  Section 1971(a)(2)(B) was recodified as 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). 
5. McKay, 226 F.3d. at 754. 
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claims, relying on a district court case to conclude that the Tennessean had no 
right to enforce that provision of the Act—only the federal government could.6 
Three years later, the Eleventh Circuit faced the exact same question and 
split with the Sixth Circuit.7  A Georgia family felt that they should not have to 
provide their Social Security numbers in order to register to vote.8  The district 
court threw out their case, relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision.9  The 
Georgians, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, appealed and 
won.10  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that there was an implied, private right 
of action to enforce the provision of the Act.11  In its opinion, the Eleventh 
Circuit sharply criticized the Sixth Circuit’s opinion on the issue.12  According 
to the Eleventh Circuit panel, the Sixth Circuit had misapplied a district court 
case, missed controlling Supreme Court precedents, ignored relevant legislative 
history and historical context, and departed from the plain language of the Act.13  
So now, people in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida can enforce that provision of 
the Voting Rights Act. People in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee 
cannot.  
Conflicts like this are commonplace—even familiar.  Lawyers and legal 
publications have long tracked conflicts.14  A law review is dedicated to 
collecting them.15  Conflicts are the perennial subject for law student notes.16  
 
6. Id. at 756 (citing Willing v. Lake Orion Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 924 F. Supp. 815, 820 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996)).  
7. Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1294–97 (11th Cir. 2003). 
8. Id. at 1286–87. 
9. Id. at 1294 (“The district court found that Congress intended § 1971(c) to foreclose the 
possibility of a private right of action under § 1983.  The district court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding in McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2000), that § 1971 is only enforceable by 
the Attorney General.”). 
10. Id. at 1285, 1297. 
11. Id. at 1296–97. 
12. Id. at 1294–97. 
13. Id. 
14. For example, U.S. Law Week has long published a well-known collection called Circuit 
Splits Roundup, which used to be associated with prominent Supreme Court practitioner Thomas 
Goldstein.  See, e.g., Baker, Generation Spent, supra note 1 at 406 n.56 (2000) (“Thomas Goldstein 
counts fifteen to twenty, on average, each month in ‘Circuit Split Roundup,’ published in U.S. Law 
Week.”). 
15. See Circuit Review Staff, Current Circuit Splits, 14 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 279 (2018). 
16. See, e.g., Andrew Yaphe, Taking Note of Notes: Student Legal Scholarship in Theory and 
Practice, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 259, 271 (2012) (“a circuit split seems like the beau ideal of a student 
note topic.”); see also Types of Notes, NYU L., 
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Conflicts persist for years, accumulating opinions on either side of an issue until 
the Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve it.17  That’s the standard practice.  
But the open secret is that the Supreme Court cannot possibly resolve all of 
the conflicts generated by the courts of appeals.  While there is vigorous and 
important debate over the frequency and effects of conflicts, avoiding such 
conflicts in federal law has long served as the lodestar of the federal appellate 
courts’ structure and operation.18  Concerns for uniformity helped justify the 
Supreme Court’s transition to a court of limited and discretionary review, and 
federal appellate judges openly identify concerns about conflicts—either 
creating one or avoiding one—as an important element of their 
decisionmaking.19  As others have recognized, this focus on achieving 
uniformity in federal law despite a growing number of judges, cases, and 
conflicts has saddled the federal courts with serious structural problems.20  
Many have proposed solutions to this problem over several decades now, 
focusing primarily on reforming the Supreme Court’s certiorari process to 
increase its capacity to decide more cases.21  Nothing has yet taken hold.  
Missing from this debate is that panels of the courts of appeals could resolve 
conflicts on their own—without Supreme Court intervention or a costly en banc 
 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/students/studentwriting/typesofnotes [https://perma.cc/R6QR-6UPT] (“a 
Note might address conflict between Circuit Courts of Appeals (a ‘circuit split’)”). 
17. See infra Section III.C discussing percolation. 
18. Regarding the influence of uniformity on the structure of the federal courts, see infra Part 
III.A.  For an example of debates over the scope and effect of circuit splits, see, e.g., Amanda Frost, 
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1584–1606 (2008) (“[T]he effects of nonuniformity do 
not seem all that troubling.”); Arthur D. Hellman, Light on A Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in 
the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 300 (“[T]he problem of unresolved 
conflicts exists only if you look for it—and look for it in a certain way.”); Arthur D. Hellman, By 
Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 
693, 795–97 (1995) (confirming that “the Supreme Court denies review in a substantial number of 
cases that present unresolved intercircuit conflicts” but concluding that “findings on persistence and 
tolerability” of conflicts “point strongly to the conclusion that unresolved intercircuit conflicts do not 
constitute a problem of serious magnitude in the federal judicial system.”). 
For better or worse—generally for worse—the goal of achieving uniformity has influenced the 
courts without a full understanding of the impact of conflicts themselves.  See, e.g., Frost, supra at 
1579 (“Uniformity has for so long simply been assumed to be a worthy goal that its supposed benefits 
have not been discussed in much detail or analyzed with any rigor.”). 
19. See infra Section II.A describing transition to court of limited review.  See also Stephen L. 
Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REV. 119, 175 (2002) (describing 
the role of conflicts in appellate decisionmaking).  
20. See infra Section II.B.  
21. See infra Section II.B.  
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rehearing.  Consider our Voting Rights Act example, where the Sixth Circuit 
decided one way in 2000 and the Eleventh Circuit decided the same issue the 
opposite way in 2003.22  In 2016, a voting rights non-profit brought the issue 
back to the Sixth Circuit, requesting that the court resolve the conflict with the 
Eleventh Circuit.23  The Sixth Circuit noted the Eleventh Circuit’s contrary 
decision, but refused to engage with the reasoning of either the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision or its own prior decision.24  Rather, the Sixth Circuit said that 
it was strictly bound to follow its prior decision unless and until the Supreme 
Court, or the entire Sixth Circuit sitting en banc, reverses it.25  The conflict 
persists to this day.26 
Why?  What prohibited the Sixth Circuit from revisiting its criticized 
decision?  The answer is the “law of the circuit” doctrine, a judge-made doctrine 
adopted by every court of appeals between the 1950s and 1970s.27  Traditionally 
understood as a tool to help manage increasing caseloads, the law of the circuit 
doctrine plays an underappreciated role in the development and persistence of 
conflicts in the federal courts.28  The heart of the doctrine is a strict rule that 
prohibits panels of a federal court of appeals from revisiting prior panel 
decisions unless there is an intervening change in higher authority, generally 
meaning a change in the law from the Supreme Court or the court of appeals 
sitting en banc.29  By contrast, on-point decisions from other circuits are not 
binding authority.30  As a result, the first panel in each circuit to address an issue 
decides that issue for all future panels in that circuit—but only that circuit.31  
 
22. Compare McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2000), with Schwier v. Cox, 340 
F.3d 1284, 1294–97 (11th Cir. 2003).  For a discussion of the circuit split see supra pp. 1403–04.  
23. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 629–30 (6th Cir. 2016) (rehearing 
en banc denied October 6, 2017). 
24. Id. at 630. 
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885, 891 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
26. As seen above, the Sixth Circuit denied a request to hear the case en banc on October 6, 
2016, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 19, 2017.  See 137 S. Ct. 2265 (2017) (denying 
certiorari). 
27. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 
794–96 (2012).  
28. Id. at 796.  
29. Id. at 797–98; Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1011, 1018 (2003). 
30. Mead, supra note 27, at 790. 
31. Id. at 796–97. 
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The first panel’s decision becomes the law of the circuit.32  Few scholars have 
discussed the doctrine at all, and no one has yet connected it to the long-
standing and ongoing debates about the negative effects of relying on the 
Supreme Court to address conflicts.33 
The purpose of this Article is to connect the law of the circuit doctrine with 
these debates, proposing that the courts of appeals relax the doctrine when a 
prior panel decision has resulted in a conflict with another court of appeals.  
This would give the latter panel an opportunity—but not necessarily the 
obligation—to settle a conflict without costly intervention by the Supreme 
Court or the entire court of appeals sitting en banc.  This proposal would help 
mitigate the structural problems created by relying solely on the Supreme Court 
to resolve conflicts, and likely help resolve more conflicts.  Moreover, this 
proposal could be implemented through methods currently used in a few of the 
courts of appeals, achieving these benefits with substantially less cost and 
disruption to the federal courts than other proposals.34  
This Article and my proposal nevertheless have important limits.  I do not 
engage debates regarding the value of pursuing uniformity in federal law.35  As 
others have done, I accept for our purposes here that the federal courts remain 
committed to pursuing uniformity in federal law, despite its virtues or vices.36  
And I consider the law of the circuit doctrine primarily as a tool of judicial 
administration, as it has been articulated by most courts and scholars.37  While 
the law of the circuit doctrine can implicate broader issues of stare decisis and 
due process, I set aside those issues for a different time.38  This Article seeks to 
advance a workable proposal to improve the function of the federal courts 
within the existing framework and assumptions of the system. 
 
32. Id. at 797. 
33. See infra Part II for a full discussion of the law of the circuit doctrine, its origins, and its 
operation.  
34. See infra Part IV for a full discussion of this proposal.  
35. See generally, e.g., Frost, supra note 18 (questioning the value of uniformity in federal law).  
36. See Wasby, supra note 19 at 122 (“I do not take issue here with the assumption, implicit in 
most discussion of intercircuit conflicts, that all intercircuit conflicts should be eliminated or at least 
kept to a bare minimum.  For present purposes, I take that debatable assumption as a given, because it 
is an important part of the background against which judges deal with the issue, and because most of 
their discussion seems to be based on its implicit acceptance.”).  
37. See infra Part III discussing the purposes of the law of the circuit doctrine.  
38. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 29, at 1060–61; Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, 
Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 598–99; Alan M. Trammell, 
Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 581–83 (2017). 
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With this in mind, the Article offers two contributions.  The first is a 
contextualized discussion of the law of the circuit doctrine, its origins, and its 
purposes.  While scholars have written about the doctrine, few have 
interrogated its origins, and those that have offer only limited accounts about 
the doctrine’s purposes.39  The first two parts of my article offer a more 
complete history and assessment of the doctrine’s purposes than what is 
currently available in the literature.  The second contribution is my proposal.  
The law of the circuit doctrine is an underlying element of the longstanding 
debates regarding conflicts and federal courts reform.  Bringing the doctrine to 
the forefront offers a new approach to these problems.  
The Article offers these contributions in three parts.  Part II contextualizes 
the law of the circuit doctrine within the history of the federal courts of appeals, 
the Supreme Court’s “shrinking docket,” and institutional reforms to the 
appellate courts such as the rise of “unpublished” opinions.  Part II also lays out 
the doctrine as it exists today.  Part III then asks why we have the doctrine, 
engaging in a critical assessment of the doctrine’s purposes and highlighting 
the role of the doctrine in maintaining the Supreme Court’s primary 
responsibility for resolving conflicts.  Part IV then lays out my proposal and its 
benefits. 
 
39. Compare, e.g., Mead, supra note 27, at 796 (“Although it is not precisely clear what sparked 
the change, [the doctrine] can probably be attributed to the confluence of two phenomena: an increase 
in the number of cases and judges, and the birth of limited publication practices.”), with Martha 
Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY. L. REV. 535, 565 (2010) 
(“The result in Textile Mills” where the Supreme Court endorsed en banc decisionmaking, “led to the 
development of the law of the circuit doctrine.”).  
Most scholars don’t attempt an explanation.  See, e.g., Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: 
Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 713, 718–19 (2009) [hereinafter Sloan, Stealth Procedures] (noting simply that every court 
follows the rule); Barrett, supra note 29, at 1017–18 (same); Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential 
Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 755, 755–56 (1993) (same).  
And courts haven’t explained themselves either.  See Kannan, supra, at 756 (“The decisions 
applying the interpanel rule have not clearly articulated their legal bases.”); see also, e.g., Hart v. 
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (statement of the Court without further explanation) 
(“The various rules pertaining to the development and application of binding authority do not reflect 
the developments of the English common law [but] rather [reflect] the organization and structure of 
the federal courts and certain policy judgments about the effective administration of justice.”) (citing 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“stare decisis is a ‘principle of policy,’ and ‘not an 
inexorable command’”)). 
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II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE LAW OF THE CIRCUIT DOCTRINE 
To understand the doctrine and its origins, it’s important to understand the 
intermediate federal courts, their changing role in the federal judiciary over 
time and, in particular, changes in their relationship with the Supreme Court.  
This Part provides that necessary background and context.  Section A surveys 
the history of the federal courts of appeals and introduces how the recurring 
effects of rising federal caseloads laid the groundwork for pervasive conflicts 
among their decisions.  Section B then describes the Supreme Court’s shrinking 
docket, which placed greater decisionmaking responsibility on the federal 
courts of appeals and eroded confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to 
maintain uniformity in federal law.  Section C then discusses the court of 
appeals’ reactions to this combination of increasing caseloads and increasing 
responsibility; specifically, the innovation of the law of the circuit doctrine and 
non-precedential, unpublished decisions.  This context sets up a critical 
discussion of the doctrine’s purposes in Part III. 
A.  A Brief History of the Federal Courts of Appeals   
1.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Riding Circuit 
The First Congress set up the basic structure of the federal courts: a 
Supreme Court with six Justices, three regional circuit courts, and thirteen 
district courts each with a district judge.40  Initially, there were no circuit 
judges.41  Rather, each circuit court was staffed by a local district judge and two 
Supreme Court Justices.42  These circuit courts had both trial and appellate 
functions, holding, for example, concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts 
over certain criminal and civil matters and appellate jurisdiction over matters 
such as civil and maritime cases above a certain amount in controversy.43  In 
addition to its original and exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court initially 
had appellate jurisdiction over cases from the federal courts and over cases from 
the state courts that “defeated” claims to federal rights.44  The Supreme Court’s 
 
40. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1–4, 1 Stat. 73; see also David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court 
Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1714–15 (2007) [hereinafter Stras, Ride 
Circuit]. 
41. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1715. 
42. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 4; Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1715.  
43. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1714, nn.23–24. 
44. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 22; see also Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 710 (2018). 
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appellate jurisdiction was mandatory, meaning it had to hear and decide every 
appeal.45  
This set up, with Justices serving on both hybrid appellate-and-trial circuit 
courts and a Supreme Court with mandatory appellate jurisdiction, was the 
basic structure for federal appeals that Congress tinkered with for the next 
hundred or so years.  One explanation for its persistence was that both 
Federalists and anti-Federalists felt change in either direction would cost more 
money.46  Appointing more judges would inflate the federal budget at the states’ 
expense—as one commenter noted, the Justices’ many roles under the 1789 Act 
may well be attributed to a “close-fisted Connecticut concern to get value for 
money.”47  Yet scrapping the appellate function of the regional circuit courts 
would impose substantial costs on litigants who would have to travel to 
Washington, D.C. to bring an appeal.48  
This initial scheme required Supreme Court Justices to devote substantial 
time away from Washington, D.C. attending circuit court, a practice known as 
“riding” the circuit.49  In early America, circuit riding was often a difficult and 
dangerous endeavor.50  The Justices had to travel long distances, generally on 
horseback or carriage, through poor weather, on poor roads (if there were roads 
at all), to poor lodging that they had to pay for themselves.51  For example, 
Justices assigned to the southern circuit (Georgia and the Carolinas) had to 
travel over two thousand miles to fulfill their circuit duties, an endeavor that 
regularly consumed over half of their year.52   
Riding circuit did offer important benefits beyond value for money.53  For 
example, getting the Justices out of Washington exposed the Justices to local 
customs and communities.54  Moreover, having the same Justices sit on both 
appellate and trial courts throughout the country encouraged uniformity in 
 
45. Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 710. 
46. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1715. 
47. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 
130.  
48. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1715. 
49. Id. at 1711 n.7. 
50. Id. at 1718. 
51. Id. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 1716. 
54. Id. 
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federal law.55  The Justices also served as a kind of roadshow for the new federal 
government.56  As part of the circuit-court duties, the Justices would perform 
important public functions that gave them an opportunity to extol the values of 
the new federal government.57  Although such opportunities did not always 
serve the Justices well as national politics changed—the Jeffersonians 
impeached Justice Samuel Chase in part because of statements he made in 
grand jury charges while presiding over a circuit court.58   
Despite these virtues, “[t]o say that most Justices disliked circuit riding 
would be an understatement.”59  The Justices regularly complained to anyone 
who would listen about their circuit duties.60  The prospect of riding circuit 
made appointment to the Court particularly unattractive to the nation’s top 
lawyers, who preferred the relative comfort of positions in the private bar or 
state governments.61  Some Justices who did accept a seat later resigned because 
of the scourge that was circuit riding.62 
Congress first heeded the Justices’ concerns in 1793, amending federal law 
to require that only one Justice attend each circuit court.63  Yet even with that 
reform, the Justices still chafed at the obligation to the point of neglect, and “it 
became increasingly common for circuit court proceedings to be held by only 
a single district judge, who often reviewed his own prior rulings in a case.”64  
Congress acted again in 1801, abolishing circuit riding altogether and creating 
sixteen new circuit judges.65  But the Judiciary Act of 1801—known to history 
as the Midnight Judges Act—is famous for other reasons: an attempt by a lame-
duck Federalist Congress to pack the judiciary with Federalist circuit judges 
 
55. Id. at 1717. 
56. Id. at 1716–17. 
57. Id.  
58. See Stephen B. Presser, Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and Against the 
Jeffersonians, 62 VAND. L. REV. 349, 363 (2009) (“[Chase’s] infamous charge given to a Baltimore 
Grand Jury in 1803 [was] the act that seems to have put in motion his impeachment proceedings.”). 
59. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1718. 
60. Id. at 1719. 
61. Id. at 1718. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 1719 (discussing the Judiciary Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333). 
64. Id. at 1722.  
65. Id. at 1719–20 (discussing the Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89). 
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that resulted in Marbury v. Madison.66  The Jeffersonians repealed the law a 
year later, sending the Justices back out on the road.67  
The deeply partisan experience of the Midnight Judges Act soured many on 
major judicial reform, contributing to a general reluctance to meaningfully 
change the federal courts during the lead up to the Civil War.68  As the country 
expanded westward, Congress would mostly maintain the status quo by creating 
a new circuit and adding a new Justice to oversee it, occasionally adjusting the 
length of the Supreme Court’s terms to help manage its growing docket.69  By 
1863, the number of circuits had grown from three to ten, and the size of the 
Supreme Court from six to ten Justices.70  Geography exacerbated many of the 
initial problems of circuit riding, with nineteenth century travel no less 
burdensome or dangerous.71  Justice Field, for example, had to travel roughly 
six weeks to get to the circuit that covered California and Oregon and was 
nearly assassinated during one trip west.72  
In 1869, Congress finally created one circuit judge for each circuit (then 
nine) and set the Supreme Court at nine Justices.73  The jurisdiction and function 
of the circuit courts largely remained the same, but now each consisted of a 
district judge from the circuit, the circuit judge, and a Supreme Court Justice.74  
The operation of these nineteenth-century circuit courts is quite foreign when 
compared to our modern scheme.  As Second Circuit Judge Raymond Lohier 
explained, 
the equivalent today [would be] Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
(the Second Circuit’s current circuit Justice), Chief District 
Judge Colleen McMahon, and I convening together to preside 
over a once-a-year sampling of federal cases in Manhattan, 
determine questions of both fact and law, and otherwise share 
 
66. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1719–20. 
67. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1720. 
68. Id. at 1721–24 (“[T]he Midnight Judges Act was a particularly infamous historical precedent 
that, in the minds of many legislators, was not to be repeated.”). 
69. Id. at 1721, 1723. 
70. Id. at 1720–21. 
71. Id. at 1721–22. 
72. Id. at 1721 n.80.  
73. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, §§ 1–2, 4, 16 Stat. 44; Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 
1725. 
74. Judiciary Act of 1869 § 2; Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1725. 
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responsibility for trial and appellate functions.75  
“Looking back,” Judge Lohier reflected, “the process was essentially 
preposterous.”76  
But the reality was that most Justices still neglected their circuit court 
duties, shirking even the infrequent requirement that they sit with the circuit 
court to instead focus on the mandatory appellate docket of the Supreme 
Court.77  This structure persisted until the innovation of the federal courts of 
appeals and eventual shift from hybrid trial-and-appellate intermediate courts 
to fully appellate intermediate courts with their own staff of judges.78  The 
Justices would have to wait until that innovation—in 1891—to stop riding 
circuit.79 
With this context in mind, it’s worth pausing to reflect on the nature and 
role of precedent during these early years.  As others have recognized, there 
was no settled doctrine of stare decisis in the United States for roughly the first 
hundred years of federal law.80  While there was some sense of the importance 
of adhering to prior decisions, unreliable reporters and other features of early 
American judicial practice diminished precedent’s role.81  Moreover, until 
1891, a group of between six and ten Supreme Court Justices were involved in 
nearly all of the appellate decisionmaking across the entire country, either as a 
member of the Supreme Court or as a member of the regional circuit courts.82  
Indeed, the unifying effect this small group of decisionmakers had on federal 
law was seen as an important benefit of the circuit-riding system.83  Although 
still complicated, precedential doctrines became more relevant as the federal 
 
75. Raymond Lohier, The Court of Appeals as the Middle Child, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 945, 946 
(2016). 
76. Id.  Others have advocated a return to the circuit riding system.  See Steven G. Calabresi & 
David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1404–05 
(2006); Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1726–51. 
77. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1723. 
78. Id. at 1725–26. 
79. Id. 
80. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 
3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 33, 35–36 (1959). 
81. Id. at 33–36. 
82. See Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis 
of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REV. 123, 130–31 (1977) (“Circuit courts in the early days of the 
Republic were extensions of the Supreme Court since Justices of the Supreme Court sat on the circuit 
courts.”).  
83. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1717. 
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courts expanded and modernized.84  The Supreme Court cultivated the now 
familiar balancing principles of stare decisis to exert a slow and purposeful 
character to changes in American law.85  But, as we will see, a completely 
different and altogether unique practice developed in the courts of appeals. 
2.  The Caseload Crisis and the Evarts Act  
To get to the courts of appeals, we first have to encounter the caseload 
crisis.  From roughly between 1875 and 1890, the overall federal caseload 
increased dramatically.86  The rising caseload stemmed from two priorities of 
the Republican-controlled government after the Civil War.87  The first priority 
was a concern for the civil rights of freed slaves in the South.88  Republicans 
pushed expansions of federal civil rights remedies with a goal of protecting 
enforcement of federal policies across the reconstructed South.89  But 
Republican interest in civil rights waned in the 1870s and gave way to a second 
priority, expanding the national economy by empowering large corporations.90  
The federal judiciary became a major tool in Republican economic policy, 
owing in large part to the party’s control over the Senate and White House over 
this period of time, which allowed them to appoint judges sympathetic to their 
economic views.91 
Republican interest in expanding the reach of federal judiciary culminated 
in the Judiciary Act of 1875, which drew the modern boundaries of federal 
jurisdiction by creating federal-question jurisdiction and expanding diversity 
jurisdiction.92  This fairly dramatic expansion in federal jurisdiction created the 
 
84. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding 
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 665–66 (1999) (discussing the historical 
significance of stare decisis and the expansion of exceptions to the rule); Polly J. Price, Precedent and 
Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 84 (2000) (explaining that the idea of precedent 
was always present but the binding effect was weak). 
85. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096, 2098 (2018) (illustrating the 
Court’s modern and complicated approach to its prior decisions). 
86. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 929, 951–53 (2013) [hereinafter Grove, Exceptions Clause].  
87. Id. at 950 n.89. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 989. 
90. Id. at 950 n.89 (“[T]he political support for civil rights enforcement waned in the 1870s, and 
the Republicans turned instead toward building a strong national economy.”). 
91. Id. at 950.  
92. Id. at 951 (citing the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1–2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71). 
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first well-known “caseload crisis” in the federal courts and the Supreme Court 
specifically.93   
While Congress was busy expanding the reach of the lower federal courts, 
there was no meaningful reform to the system of processing appeals.94  The 
1789 scheme of appellate jurisdiction was still largely in place and the Supreme 
Court had mandatory jurisdiction over nearly all appeals.95  This scheme 
perceived of the Supreme Court as resolving a narrow range of issues—namely, 
interstate disputes and state court compliance with the then-limited range of 
federal laws.96  But the jurisdiction of the federal courts had expanded 
significantly to cover a wider range of issues, including non-federal issues when 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction.97  The Court thus became burdened by 
mandatory jurisdiction over appeals covering a wide-range of new federal and 
non-federal issues.98  During this time, the Supreme Court was processing 
somewhere between a quarter and a third of the matters docketed in a term.99   
The Justices pleaded to Congress for relief, eventually resulting in the 
Judiciary Act of 1891, also known as the Evarts Act after its sponsor Senator 
William Evarts.100  The bargain of the 1891 Act was to maintain mandatory 
Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases involving questions of federal law, but 
to give discretionary jurisdiction over other cases, such as diversity suits, 
patent, admiralty, criminal, and tax cases.101  In the Supreme Court’s place, a 
new system of intermediate federal appellate courts—the federal circuit courts 
of appeals—would review these issues.102  The Evarts Act also created new 
circuit judge positions and, at long last, abolished mandatory circuit riding.103  
The circuit courts themselves lingered on separate from the circuit courts of 
appeals, creating particularly complicated questions of the relationship between 
the two intermediate courts until the circuit courts’ abolition in 1911.104  But 
 
93. Id. at 951–53. 
94. Id. at 952–53. 
95. Id.  
96. Id. at 948. 
97. Id. at 951. 
98. Id. at 952–53. 
99. Id. at 953. 
100. Id. at 954, 957–58. 
101. Id. at 958 n.141. 
102. Id. at 954, 956–57.  
103. Stras, Ride Circuit, supra note 40, at 1725–26. 
104. See id. at 1726; Vestal, supra note 82, at 136. 
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eventually the Evarts Act gave the federal court system a familiar “symmetry 
and logic,” with the courts of appeals serving as the intermediate 
decisionmakers and the Supreme Court as “the apex” who would “establish the 
corpus juris of the federal system.”105 
The introduction of this discretionary review is often the focus of the 
Evart’s Act, and it marked an important shift in the role of the Supreme Court.  
Rather than processing the majority of appeals, the Evarts Act saw the Supreme 
Court as taking a supervisory role to “guard against diversity of judgment” in 
the intermediate appellate courts.106  The goal was to provide the Court with 
“flexibility, elasticity, and openness” in its docket such that it could review 
cases “in the interest of jurisprudence and uniformity of decision.”107 
But another way of viewing the Supreme Court’s new discretionary review 
scheme is that the Act gave intermediate appellate courts final authority over 
certain cases.  For our purposes, this was the primary innovation of the Evarts 
Act that marked the beginnings of the modern character of the federal appellate 
courts.  The Supreme Court became a court of limited and discretionary review 
dedicated to systemic principles like uniformity, while the mine-run of appeals 
would be processed by independent, regional courts of appeals without further 
oversight.  The minds behind the Evarts Act were aware that the change would 
create more conflicts and sought to balance that outcome with a structural 
compromise: the cost of the Supreme Court’s freedom will be a responsibility 
to supervise the lower courts to maintain uniformity.108  Over time, increasing 
caseloads will stress this compromise.  The courts of appeals will gain greater 
independence from each other and the Supreme Court, while the Supreme 
Court’s capacity (or desire) to maintain uniformity in federal law will fail.  The 
resulting proliferation of conflicts has been a concern for decades.  
The Evarts Act was only the beginning, however, of the Supreme Court’s 
path towards complete control over its docket and full freedom from the work 
of the lower courts.  Importantly, the Act offered two ways to get the Supreme 
Court to review a case: by writ of certiorari, and by certification from the federal 
courts of appeals.109  This second path gave the intermediate appellate courts 
some control over the Supreme Court’s docket by identifying questions that the 
 
105. See Vestal, supra note 82, at 140. 
106. See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 86, at 954 (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 10,222 (1890) 
(statement of Sen. William Maxwell Evarts, R-N.Y.)). 
107. Id. at 954–55 n.123. 
108. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 561–62. 
109. See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 86, at 958.  
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Supreme Court would have to address.110  But, as we’ll see, the Supreme Court 
soon consolidated nearly complete control over its docket—leaving the courts 
of appeals with dramatic and seemingly unexpected independence.     
3.  The Judges’ Bill and the Discretionary Docket 
The introduction of intermediate appellate courts and discretionary review 
by the Supreme Court began a counterintuitive cycle that repeated over the next 
decades: federal dockets balloon in size, and in response the Supreme Court 
decides fewer cases, leaving the courts of appeals with greater independence.  
Granting the Supreme Court some control over its docket in 1891 did not end 
the Supreme Court’s caseload problems, and Congress exacerbated things by 
continuing to expand the Court’s jurisdiction over the twentieth century.111  In 
1914, Congress expanded certiorari jurisdiction to include all state cases where 
federal questions were involved, rather than simply cases where federal right 
had been defeated, as was the case since 1789.112  And later, Congress added 
bankruptcy cases to the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.113  
The Court’s new role as “supervisor[] over” federal law was partly to blame 
for these expansions of its jurisdiction.114  It made sense to have the Court 
review all state cases involving federal issues and cases involving the federal 
bankruptcy powers if the Court was to supervise all federal law.115  But this 
prompted yet another caseload crisis, which in turn prompted the Judiciary Act 
of 1925, the so-called Judges’ Bill.116   
The 1925 Act is most closely associated with Chief Justice Taft, who 
lobbied “energetically” to shift the Court to an almost-entirely discretionary 
docket.117  Taft summarized that, since “the business has accumulated so that 
one court can not take care of all the appellate business, intermediate courts are 
introduced, and the office of the Supreme Court has ceased to be that of a 
 
110. Id.  Some have argued to return to certification.  See Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme 
Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310, 1319–26 (2010). 
111. See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 86, at 962. 
112. Id. at 963; Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 710. 
113. Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 86, at 963. 
114. Id. at 957, 963. 
115. Id. at 963. 
116. Id. at 963, 966–67; Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 711. 
117. Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 711–12; see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning 
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 
1660–98 (2000) (discussing Taft’s role in pursuing the discretionary docket). 
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tribunal to afford everybody a review of his case.”118  Rather, the Court’s “real 
work” was now to decide “important” and “significant” cases “for the purpose 
of expounding and stabilizing principles of law“ that would “make the law 
clearer” to the public and litigants.119  Although there is a slight shift in rhetoric 
from uniformity to overall importance, there is a fairly clear line from the Evarts 
Act to the Judges’ Bill connecting systemic values such as stability and 
uniformity in federal law with the Court’s transition to a kind of judicial 
policymaker with control over its own agenda.120 
Yet the cycle continued: federal litigation grew at a dramatic rate through 
the latter half of the twentieth century and again outpaced the Court’s ability to 
manage its docket.121  The Court responded by retreating further still, generally 
deciding fewer cases (although there were some important fluctuations during 
the Warren and Burger courts).122  In 1988, Congress eliminated the Court’s 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction in all but a few circumstances.123  The Court 
had achieved effectively complete control over what it would decide.124 
The relatively consistent rhetoric along the Supreme Court’s path to a 
discretionary docket masks the lack of guidance to the courts of appeals about 
their role in this new scheme.  The creation in 1891 of intermediate appellate 
courts also created an intermediate body of decisional law without any real 
 
118. Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
48 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, Vertical Maximalism]. 
119. Id. at 48–50 (first quoting William Howard Taft, Address to the New York County Bar 
Association 6–7 (Feb. 18, 1922), microformed on William H. Taft Papers, Reel 590 (Library of 
Congress); then quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68–1075, at 2 (1925); and then quoting Jurisdiction of Circuit 
Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. On 
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922)). 
120. For modern treatment of the Supreme Court’s various roles, see, for example, Randy J. 
Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Discretionary Dockets, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 237–44 (2016) 
(discussing the implications of different views of the Supreme Court’s role on its docket management).  
Notably, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 35(5) in 1925 that expressly noted intercircuit conflicts as 
one of the reasons for granting certiorari.  See SUP. CT. R. 35(5)(b), 266 U.S. 681 (1925) (repealed 
1939).  However, the rule also emphasized the discretionary nature of the Court’s review.  Id.  
121. Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 118, at 51–52. 
122. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
123. Judiciary Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1257–58 (1988)).  
124. See Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 118, at 51 (“In 1988, Congress responded by 
largely eliminating the Court’s remaining mandatory appellate jurisdiction so that the Court could hear 
virtually every appeal by way of discretionary certiorari review.”). 
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thought to its internal management or structure.125  While Congress intervened 
in limited ways to increase the capacity of the courts of appeals—for example, 
Congress would increase the number of judges and staff in the circuits, create 
the Tenth Circuit in 1929, and split the Fifth Circuit in two in 1981—little was 
done to address this growing body of decisional law or the growing distance 
between the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals.126  Combining 
the anachronistic geography of the circuit courts with more appellate 
decisionmakers and decreased supervision from the Supreme Court started the 
federal judiciary down a path towards producing less uniformity in federal law, 
not more.127  These circumstances have created the conditions for pervasive 
conflicts among the lower circuits that, as far as we can tell, has quickly 
outpaced the Supreme Court’s ability (or desire) to resolve them.  
B.  The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket  
The Supreme Court’s shrinking docket is well-known phenomenon among 
scholars and observers of the federal courts.128  The basic “paradox” is that the 
Supreme Court has decided fewer cases while overall federal caseloads have 
increased.129  For example, the Supreme Court has generally issued fewer 
opinions over the twentieth century, from between 150 to 200 written opinions 
 
125. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 582 n.321. 
126. See id. (discussing the creation of new circuits); infra Section II.C (discussing increase in 
judges and staff). 
127. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, Commentary, The Need for A New 
National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1407 (1987) (“The concept of the ‘law of the circuit,’ 
sometimes called the rule of interpanel accord, obliges a panel of circuit judges to treat as binding 
precedent earlier decisions of that same court of appeals, absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court 
action.  Decisions of other courts of appeals, however, are deemed merely persuasive.  This practice 
weakens the theory of one national law.”). 
128. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary 
Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 739 (2001) (“[P]resent[ing] a comprehensive assessment of the 
causes of this recent decline in the Supreme Court’s plenary docket”); Arthur D. Hellman, The 
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 404 [hereinafter Hellman, Shrunken 
Docket]; Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming 
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1508 (2008) [hereinafter Lazarus, Advocacy 
Matters] (“Others have written about the possible causes of the shrinking docket, which reportedly 
even mystifies the Justices themselves.”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking 
Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006) [hereinafter Starr, 
The Ghost] (“While no single answer explains the Rehnquist Court’s docket-shrinking behavior, the 
continual (and consistent) reduction of its caseload has been well documented.”). 
129. See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 128, at 1507–08 (identifying the shrinking 
docket as a “paradox”). 
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in the 1930s to around 70 written opinions a term in 2016, with a bit of 
variability until a fairly steady decline since the 1980s.130  It is this modern 
(1980–90s) decline that most are referencing when they talk about the Court’s 
“shrinking docket.”131  By contrast, there has been a nearly twenty-fold increase 
in cases terminated by federal courts of appeals during this period—from less 
than 3,000 cases in 1932 to over 55,000 cases in 2016.132  Perhaps more 
tellingly, the Supreme Court reviews shockingly few of the merits decisions of 
the federal courts of appeals—between 70 and 80 of the 40,000 decisions issued 
“on the merits” by the courts of appeals a year.133  Based on these numbers, a 
panel of a federal appellate court that decided a case on the merits in 2016 risked 
about a .002% chance that the Supreme Court would review its work.  
The Supreme Court has maintained a focus on resolving conflicts even as 
its docket shrinks, which has resulted in important structural problems that 
exacerbate the distance between the Supreme Court and courts of appeals.134  
 
130. For the Supreme Court data, I used the Federal Judicial Center’s numbers on cases disposed 
“[b]y written opinions” from 1932 to 1969 and cases “[d]isposed by full opinion” from 1970 to 2016.  
Caseloads: Supreme Court of the United States, Method of Disposition, 1932–1969, FED. JUD. CTR. 
[hereinafter Caseloads: 1932–1969], https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-supreme-court-
united-states-method-disposition-1932-1969 [https://perma.cc/4VAH-7SRX?type=image]; 
Caseloads: Supreme Court of the United States, Method of Disposition, 1970–2016, FED. JUD. CTR. 
[hereinafter Caseloads: 1970–2016], https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-supreme-court-
united-states-method-disposition-1970-2016 [https://perma.cc/QSB6-36PC?type=image].  I’m 
assuming that these numbers are roughly analogous.  Notably, both sets of numbers exclude per curiam 
opinions, even those issued after argument.  Caseloads: 1932–1969, supra; Caseloads: 1970–2016, 
supra. 
131. See, e.g., Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supra note 128 (comparing Supreme Court docket 
composition from the 1980s and 1990s); Starr, The Ghost, supra note 128, at 1368 (focusing on the 
Rehnquist Court). 
132. For the Court of Appeals data, I also used the Federal Judicial Center’s numbers on cases 
terminated in the courts of appeals between 1932 and 2016.  Caseloads: U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1892–
2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-us-courts-appeals-1892-2017 
[https://perma.cc/GR6N-XMK6?type=image]. 
133. See FAQ – General Information, SUP. CT. U.S.,  
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/ERT5-7MKW] (noting that 
the Supreme Court grants certiorari in about 1% of the roughly 8000 petitions for certiorari); U.S. 
COURTS, TABLE B-12. U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES 
TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 
2016, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LZ9T-3J3J] (noting the merits decisions of the courts of appeals in 2016). 
134. See Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supra note 128, at 415–16 (“[C]ases presenting intercircuit 
conflicts did decline in number between the 1980s and the 1990s[, b]ut the diminution in conflict grants 
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For example, the Court seemingly fills a majority of its small docket—about 
70%—with cases involving purported conflicts.135  And it’s well known among 
practitioners that the presence of a circuit split on an issue is the most consistent 
indicator of whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in a case.136  
Separate from the impact of conflicts themselves,137 the Court’s focus on 
conflicts has created structural problems between the Supreme Court and courts 
of appeals, such as what Daniel Epps and William Ortman have called 
“informational” and “accountability” gaps.138  The vast majority of appellate 
decisions will not result in a split, such that it is all but guaranteed that the 
Supreme Court will not review appellate decisions in cases that are typical or 
quotidian.139  Moreover, there are important issues where splits just do not 
develop as frequently or at all, such as where law or circumstance send a 
particular type of case to one circuit court (like patent cases in the Federal 
Circuit) or a small number of circuits (like Indian law cases in the Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth circuits).140  Likewise, splits may not develop on important issues 
where lower courts agree on a legal standard but need guidance in how to apply 
 
is modest compared with the shrinkage in cases that did not involve intercircuit conflicts . . .  [and] the 
number of conflict [cases involving statutory interpretation] actually increased[.]”).  
135. See Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (2013) (“As many as 70% of the cases before the Court where 
certiorari has been granted present clear conflicts between either the federal courts of appeals or state 
courts of last resort.”); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in 
the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 981 (2007) (“Evaluating petitions for certiorari, lower 
court opinions, and the Court’s opinion to determine whether a case involved a lower court conflict, 
the study determined that nearly 70% of the cases reviewed by the Court involved a split among the 
lower courts.”) (book review).  
That said, conflicts are notoriously difficult to track, partly because there are incentives for 
lawyers and judges to hide, grandstand, or otherwise manipulate the extent of a conflict for purposes 
of influencing the Court’s review.  See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Measuring Circuit Splits: A 
Cautionary Note, 4 J.L. 361, 361–62 (2014) (discussing why it is “difficult” to determine which of the 
Supreme Court’s cases involve splits “and how the difficulties mar the resulting measurements” of the 
Supreme Court’s relationship with intercircuit conflicts); see also id. at 375 (“One could read the 
certiorari petitions, of course, but taking them at face value would likely lead to overinclusion, given 
that petitioners have a powerful incentive to claim a conflict whenever possible.”). 
136. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A. 
HARTNETT, & DAN HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 4.3, 4.4 (10th ed. 2013).  
137. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 18, at 1582–84. 
138. Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 717–23.   
139. Id. at 721–22. 
140. Id. at 728–29; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless, The Certiorari 
Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 956 (2009). 
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that standard, or where the consensus of appellate courts simply get the law 
wrong.141  The Court’s focus on conflicts therefore deprives the Court of a full 
picture of the types of cases and issues facing the lower courts, including what 
issues are important to resolve—the “informational” gap.142  And the courts of 
appeals judges know the vast majority of their decisions will not be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court, especially if they write an opinion that appears routine—
the “accountability” gap.143  
The Court’s focus on splits also opens its docket to more direct 
manipulation.  The Supreme Court’s decisions have immense influence over 
the nation as a whole, and the Court’s reliance on splits gives lawyers and 
Court-watchers a clear, reliable signal to tap the Court’s power.  By creating or 
tracking splits, a small group of Supreme Court practitioners and the interests 
they represent have “captured” the Supreme Court’s docket.144  These lawyers 
represent the vast majority of clients before the Court, sometimes arguing 
several cases before the Court in a single term.145  This capture yields a 
substantial influence over the Court’s decisions: studies show that you are not 
only more likely to have the Court grant review in your case if one of these 
repeat players represents you, you are more likely to win your case too.146  The 
Court’s continued focus on resolving splits is the key to this influence.  
Concerns with how the Supreme Court selects cases and the impact that 
process has on the courts of appeals have prompted calls for reform over several 
decades, many of which were focused on the specific problem of pervasive 
conflicts.147  For example, a study group of the Federal Judicial Center 
 
141. Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 729.  
142. Id. at 720. 
143. Id. at 721–23.  
144. Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 89 (2009) 
[hereinafter Lazarus, Docket Capture], https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/docket-capture-at-the-
high-court [https://perma.cc/4JG8-S3ZY] (discussing “the very real possibility that the Court’s plenary 
docket is increasingly captured by an elite group of expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated by 
those in the private bar.”). 
145. Id. at 90; Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 128, at 1520.  
146. See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 128, at 1521–62 (2008) (discussing repeat 
advocates’ success at the certiorari and merits stage); see also Adam Feldman, Who Wins in the 
Supreme Court? An Examination of Attorney and Law Firm Influence, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 429, 459 
(2016) (“The most experienced attorneys and firms predominately write briefs that are more successful 
(based on the overlap measure) than those from other attorneys.  Their briefs are also generally of a 
higher than average writing quality for briefs submitted to the Supreme Court.”).  
147. See generally Baker, Generation Spent, supra note 1 (discussing the history of reforms).  
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appointed by Chief Justice Burger was tasked with studying the Supreme 
Court’s caseload and methods for resolving it.148  In 1972, the group “called for 
nothing less than a widescale revamping of the federal judiciary system[,]” 
including creating a new National Court of Appeals dedicated to resolving 
conflicts in the Supreme Court’s place.149  The proposal for a national court to 
address conflicts was subsequently endorsed by a congressional commission150 
and the Federal Judicial Center’s Advisory Council on Appellate Justice in 
1975,151 revived by Chief Justice Burger in the early 1980s,152 but then went 
nowhere.153  The string of proposals rejected in the Judicial Conference’s 1995 
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts—including, for example, “proposals 
to consolidate the present circuits into a few ‘jumbo’ circuits” or create “a new 
tier of federal courts”154—is illustrative of the surprising breadth and tenor of 
debates over reforming the relationship between the Supreme Court and courts 
of appeals during this time. 
There has been a notable increase in proposals to reform the Supreme 
Court’s docket in the last decade or so, often with a focus on conflicts.155  For 
example, Epps and Ortman recently argued that the Supreme Court should 
 
148. Comment, The National Court of Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality, and 
Desirability, 41 FORDHAM LAW REV. 863, 863 (1973).  
149. Id. at 863–64. 
150. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal 
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 208–09 (1975) [hereinafter Hruska 
Commission Report] (“The Commission recommends the creation of a new national court of appeals, 
designed to[, among other things,] resolv[e] conflicts between circuits after they have developed, 
and . . . , by anticipating and avoiding possible future conflicts, eliminate years of repetitive litigation 
and uncertainty as to the state of the federal law.”). 
151. See Baker, Generation Spent, supra note 1, at 402 (“After a four-year study, the Advisory 
Council, comprised of judges, lawyers, and law professors, developed guidelines for restructuring the 
federal appellate system much in line with the recommendations from the Hruska Commission.”). 
152. See Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 
GA. L. REV. 913, 930 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Alternative Futures] (noting that the Chief Justice 
revived the proposal in 1983 and that “Justices White, Rehnquist, Powell, and O’Connor supported the 
Chief Justice’s idea”).  But see Brennan, Jr., supra note 3, at 475 (arguing against the proposition of a 
National Court of Appeals). 
153. Baker, Generation Spent, supra note 1, at 402; see also Chief Judge Edward R. Becker, 
Contemplating the Future of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 346 (2000) 
(“As we have seen, the suggestions for a National Court of Appeals have disappeared; they are not 
even on the radar screen anymore in view of the sharply decreasing docket of the Supreme Court.”). 
154. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 46 
(1995). 
155. See Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 729 (“[P]roposals have proliferated in recent years”). 
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select its cases by lottery to help mitigate the negative effects of its focus on 
conflicts.156  Other proposals have included reforming certiorari around 
administrative law principles;157 remaking the Supreme Court along the lines of 
the courts of appeals so that it can decide more cases and conflicts;158 adding 
more judges,159 adding more staff,160 or limiting the role of law clerks in the 
certiorari process;161 reviving courts of appeals’ ability to certify cases;162 and 
just flat forcing the Supreme Court to take more cases.163 
Most of these proposals focus on reforming the certiorari process, and 
within this context, debate which reform will cause the least disruption to the 
work and structure of the federal courts.164  In doing so, most proposals have 
overlooked opportunities to reform how the courts of appeals generate and 
perpetuate conflicts.165  To consider those opportunities, we need to understand 
how the circuit courts’ decisionmaking practices have changed in the face of 
increasing caseloads and the Supreme Court’s shrinking docket.  As the next 
 
156. Id. at 732–34.  
157. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (2011). 
158. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the 
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449–50 (2009). 
159. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the 
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 632 (2009). 
160. Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 144, at 97. 
161. Starr, The Ghost, supra note 128, at 1376–77. 
162. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of 
Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1289 (2010); Tyler, supra note 110, at 1319–26. 
163. Starr, The Ghost, supra note 128, at 1366.  
164. See, e.g., Epps & Ortman, supra note 44, at 731 n.171 (“George and Guthrie’s innovative 
proposal would achieve some of the same benefits as our proposal, but—given its total redesign of the 
Supreme Court—at a substantially higher cost. Our proposal would be far easier to implement.”).  
165. The primary exception is proposals to make the first decision in any circuit the law of all 
circuits, which I discuss in Section III.B.2.  See Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: 
Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 
TENN. L. REV. 605, 635 (2003) (arguing in favor of “intercircuit stare decisis”); Dragich, supra note 
39, at 587 (same).  Todd Thompson also proposed reforming the courts of appeals rather than the 
Supreme Court to deal with caseload problems, but unlike proposals of a strict rule of intercircuit stare 
decisis, Thompson proposed structural changes to the courts of appeals, such as dividing the courts 
into subject-matter divisions and proposing an alternative national court that would “act like an en banc 
panel for the entire circuit court system.”  Todd E. Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in 
the Federal Appellate System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 492–503 (1984).  Like structural 
reforms to the Supreme Court, structural reforms to the courts of appeals also risk high implementation 
costs.  
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section explains, the courts of appeals developed their own tools to cope with 
the twin pressures of increasing caseloads and increasing independence, 
including the law of the circuit doctrine to help manage each circuit’s growth 
and independence.  But in a world where the Supreme Court cannot 
meaningfully reconcile conflicts across these independent circuits, the law of 
the circuit doctrine now exacerbates the negative effects of the Court’s focus 
on uniformity.  
C.  Precedent and Publication in the Courts of Appeals 
While the overall structure of the federal courts did not change, increasing 
caseloads nevertheless caused several important institutional changes in the 
courts of appeals over the middle of the twentieth century.  The courts received 
(many) more judges—from 19 judges in 1892, to 75 judges in 1950, to 179 
judges in 1990.166  These judges sat on an increasing variety of three-judge 
panels, issuing more decisions.167  It became normal for the panel of judges 
deciding a case to not know the views of the other judges on the court regarding 
the issues they were deciding.168  The courts also received more staff, and 
judges began to rely on staff attorneys and law clerks to perform in-chambers 
functions historically seen as aspects of the judicial function, such as screening 
unmeritorious appeals, closely reading the record and precedents, and drafting 
opinions.169  Less time, more hands, and more cases led to both real and 
perceived decreases in the quality of appellate decisionmaking.170  The job lost 
features of an orderly, collegial, and careful deliberative process that was a 
 
166. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 13, 
tbl.2-2 (1998) [hereinafter White Commission Report].  
167. Id. at 13–14. 
168. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 150, at 266 (“Even under more favorable 
conditions many circuits no longer undertake to have each active judge review decisions before they 
are handed down, and in larger circuits there is already evidence that all of the judges may no longer 
be able to remain current with the law of the circuit as it develops.”). 
169. See White Commission Report, supra note 166, at 21–23 (discussing the “genuinely new” 
practice “[s]tarting in the early 1970s” of hiring “central staff attorneys to,” among other things, 
“perform a screening function,” “review the briefs and records,” and “in some courts . . . recommend 
dispositions and draft proposed opinions.”).  
170. See, e.g., id. at 24 (“[T]he process . . . raises apprehensions as to the degree of 
attention . . . appeals actually receive from judges themselves”). 
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hallmark of the courts’ initial years.171  In its place was a rushed, isolating, and 
seemingly endless press of appeals.172  
The Supreme Court’s increasing distance from the courts of appeals and 
general lack of guidance from Congress provide important context to these 
changes in the character of the courts of appeals.  The courts of appeals were 
developing into an independent institution largely on their own, making it up 
as they went.  Many issues were on the table, without clear answers: how would 
the geographic circuits interact with each other?  How would the increasingly 
large number of judges within a circuit interact with each other?  How would 
the courts of appeals understand their relationship to the increasingly distant 
Supreme Court?  The courts confronted these issues mostly over the latter part 
of the twentieth century.173  One innovation of this period was the development 
of the law of the circuit doctrine.  The primary purpose of this section is to 
describe the law of the circuit doctrine as it developed and as it exists today.  
Another innovation of this period was the adoption of policies to not publish 
certain decisions, or what I’ll call “nonpublication” policies.  A secondary 
purpose of this section is to briefly distinguish the law of the circuit doctrine 
from nonpublication policies.  Though sometimes conflated, the two are 
distinct, and distinguishing them offers greater clarity regarding the purposes 
of the law of the circuit doctrine and its role in perpetuating conflicts among 
the circuits.  This clarity sets up our critical discussion of the doctrine’s 
purposes in Part III.   
1.  The Law of the Circuit 
The law of the circuit doctrine is, at its heart, a “strict,” “binding,” and 
“rigid” rule that a panel of a federal court of appeals may not revisit the decision 
of a prior panel on the same court.174  Rather, a panel may only revisit a prior 
 
171. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited 
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 
1168 (1978) (quoting Remarks by Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz, Third Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 
22, 1976)) (“I hope I am not telling secrets when I say that there was an overwhelming feeling that in 
deciding, as they do now, some 240 cases a year, they [the circuit judges] were perilously close to 
compromising the integrity of the decision making process.”). 
172. Id. (quoting Remarks by Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz, Third Circuit Judicial Conference 
(Sept. 22, 1976)) (“[J]udges were concerned whether they had sufficient ‘thinking’ and research time 
to feel reasonably satisfied with their votes in all the 240 or more appeals on which they sat.”). 
173. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 
811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987); Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985 (1st Cir. 1986). 
174. See Barrett, supra note 29, at 1017–18, 1018 n.20 (collecting cases from every circuit).  
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decision when there has been an intervening change in higher authority, like an 
en banc or Supreme Court decision or a change in statutory or constitutional 
law.175  The rule itself is sometimes referred to as the “prior panel rule” or rule 
of “interpanel accord.”176  The phrases “circuit precedent” and “law of the 
circuit” are often used to describe both the rule and the body of case law within 
a specific circuit (both panel decisions and en banc decisions) that enjoys the 
benefit of the rule.177  
Every circuit adopted this rule in case-law, and many reiterate it in local 
rules or court policies.178  Nevertheless, there can be considerable variation in 
how the modern rule is applied.179  For example, what counts as a “change” in 
higher authority can vary from circuit to circuit.  Some circuits will revisit a 
case because the reasoning of a new Supreme Court case undermines the 
reasoning of a prior decision.180  Other circuits refuse to do just that.181  At least 
one circuit recognizes “rare circumstances” where “non-controlling but 
persuasive case law”—including decisions from other circuits—can justify 
 
175. See id. at 1018 n.20 (collecting cases from every circuit).  
176. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rather, under the 
rule of interpanel accord, we must follow Colson unless there is intervening Supreme Court authority 
or en banc authority to the contrary.”); Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“Under the prior panel rule, we are bound by the holdings of earlier panels unless and until they 
are clearly overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.”); see also, e.g., Dragich, supra note 39, at 538 
(“To promote intracircuit consistency, the ‘prior panel rule’ or ‘rule of interpanel accord’ holds that 
the decision of any panel binds the court of appeals itself and the district courts within the circuit.”). 
177. See, e.g., United States v. Orona, 923 F.3d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting the obligation 
“to ‘apply our prior circuit precedent without running afoul of the intervening authority.’”); San Juan 
Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The ‘law of the circuit’ rule” states that 
“newly constituted panels in a multi-panel circuit court are bound by prior panel decisions that are 
closely on point.”); see also, e.g., Hruska Commission Report, supra note 150, at 205 (discussing 
“stability and harmony in the law of the circuit”).  
178. Barrett, supra note 29, at 1017–18 (noting “the rule . . .  that one panel cannot overrule 
another” is “followed in every circuit”); Mead, supra note 27, at 794–95 (“With the arguable exception 
of the Seventh Circuit, each circuit court has adopted some version of ‘law of the circuit.’”). 
179. See Mead, supra note 27, at 795 (discussing the doctrine’s “considerable complexity”). 
180. See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 258 (1st Cir. 2011) (“A Supreme Court 
opinion need not be directly on point to undermine one of our opinions.”). 
181. See, e.g., In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“[A] panel of this court can only overrule a prior panel decision if such overruling is unequivocally 
directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.”). 
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departing from a prior decision.182  Others refuse to do just that.183  And some 
circuits have made it easier to reconsider prior decisions by, for example, 
changing their en banc rules to allow hearings with less than the full 
membership of the court.184  Or by allowing panels to overrule prior decisions 
so long as the panel’s new decision is first circulated to all members of the court 
for approval—sometimes called “mini-en banc” procedures.185  Other circuits 
haven’t made such changes.186  The bottom line is that the doctrine is strict 
enough to generally prohibit circuits from reconsidering prior decisions in light 
of a relevant change in circumstances, but multifaceted enough that the same 
change can yield different outcomes in different circuits.187  
This strict, rule-based approach to prior decisions is a departure from a 
flexible approach to prior decisions that predominated in the circuit courts and 
courts of appeals through most of their history.188  For example, the early 
intermediate courts seemed to treat both relevant prior decisions and decisions 
from other circuits similarly, viewing them as not binding but worthy of careful 
consideration.189  The strict, rule-based approach to prior decisions currently 
 
182. United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 438–39 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2001)).  
183. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236–37 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (“It is 
important to note that the First Circuit employs a different prior precedent rule.”). 
184. 9TH CIR. R. 35–3 (providing for a “Limited En Banc Court” with the Chief Judge and 10 
randomly-drawn active judges). 
185. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 40(e); Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“The foregoing part of the division’s decision, because it resolves an apparent conflict between two 
prior decisions, has been separately considered and approved by the full court, and thus constitutes the 
law of the circuit.”); see also Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67 n.9 
(2d Cir. 2009) (referring to the practice of circulating an opinion overruling a prior panel decision to 
all active members of the court prior to filing a “mini-en banc” process). 
186. See Sloan, Stealth Procedures, supra note 39, at 726 (noting that “The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits do not authorize or use” informal en banc 
procedures). 
187. Compare, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 2008) (overruling a 
prior panel decision because the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 
(2007), undermined its reasoning), with United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 418–19 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (overruling prior panel decision in light of Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, using 7TH CIR. R. 
40(e)), and Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236–37 n.3 (refusing to overrule prior decision in light of 
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, and distinguished the First Circuit’s approach). 
188. See Mead, supra note 27, at 795, 795 n.58 (noting that “[h]istorically, some deference was 
extended, but panels could reject precedent if it was erroneous in the later panel’s eyes” and collecting 
cases as early as 1919).  
189. Vestal, supra note 82, at 130–31. 
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applied in the courts of appeals is “decidedly modern.”190  The strict approach 
seems to have “surfaced” in the late 1950s,191 “change[d]” the circuits’ 
approach to prior decisions through the 1960s,192 and “solidified” across the 
circuits in the 1970s.193  
Most courts adopting the strict rule generally did not explain why they were 
making this change.194  Those that did stressed the need to maintain uniformity 
and stability in the circuit’s decisions.195  This is consistent with contemporary 
sources, which described the rule as a “tradition” or practice the courts 
themselves developed, rather than, for example, an obligation dictated by 
statute or Supreme Court precedent.196  To this day, the rule-like approach to 
the courts of appeals’ prior decisions is distinguishable from balancing 
principles of stare decisis applied by the Supreme Court to its own decisions.197 
 
190. Barrett, supra note 29, at 1065–66; see also Mead, supra note 27, at 795 (“The adoption of 
a law-of-the-circuit rule is a ‘relatively modern judicial phenomenon.’”). 
191. Barrett, supra note 29, at 1065–66. 
192. Mead, supra note 27, at 796; see also, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197, 201 
(2d Cir. 1966) (noting that the flexible “rule of our circuit has commanded no following in other federal 
courts of appeals and has been much criticized by the commentators.”). 
193. Mead, supra note 27, at 796. 
194. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 259 F.2d 801, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (“It is an informal 
but generally accepted rule of this court that a recent opinion of a division may not be overruled by 
another panel of judges, but only by the full bench.”); Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp. v. United States, 265 
F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1958) (“However, we will not overrule these recent decisions of other panels of 
the court.”), vacated on other grounds, 363 U.S. 685 (1960); see also Barrett, supra note 29, at 1066 
n.214 (collecting some early cases). 
195. See, e.g., Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985 (1st Cir. 1986) (“Uniformity of decisions 
within a multi-panel circuit can only be achieved by strict adherence to prior circuit precedent, with 
the error-correcting function reserved to the court sitting en banc.”); see also Of Course, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 499 F.2d 754, 760 (4th Cir. 1974) (Boreman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“This Circuit has deemed it unseemly, presumptuous and an unacceptable practice for one panel to 
assume to overrule a decision of another panel of this court; the decision of a panel becomes the law 
of the Circuit until it is overruled by the court sitting in banc.”). 
196. See, e.g., Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984) (“It is the 
tradition of this court that reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels.”) (quoting the 
Internal Operating Procedures of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Chapter 8.C.). 
197. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018) (discussing stare 
decisis); see also Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1465 (2010) 
(“Because there was no individual or group of individuals who would purport to independently speak 
for ‘the court,’ it should not be surprising that the rules of precedent developed in a manner that treated 
prior panel decisions as binding on subsequent panels to a degree that was even stronger—that is, more 
binding—than that followed by the Supreme Court or individual district court judges.”). 
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In contrast to the strict prior panel rule, the circuits’ have maintained a 
flexible approach to the decisions of other circuits.  Before the appointment of 
circuit judges in 1869, the circuit courts were, in many ways, “extensions of the 
Supreme Court,” and opinions from that time show that the Justices sitting in 
circuit courts gave opinions of other Justices respectful consideration but “not 
conclusive” weight until they all sat together on an issue.198  With the advent of 
circuit judges, these judges struggled with whether to follow relevant opinions 
from other jurisdictions on similar issues, sometimes deferring and sometimes 
not, but generally avoiding a strict rule.199  One circuit judge’s opinion from 
1891, for example, rejected a party’s argument that “when one circuit court of 
the United States decides a point, all the others should conform their views to 
this decision, until the matter is settled by the rulings of the supreme court,” 
reasoning that “[i]n the Bible there is the command: ‘Thou shalt not follow a 
multitude to do evil.’”200  
The issue of whether or not to follow the decisions of other circuits enjoys 
one of the rare instances of Supreme Court guidance in this area.  In Mast, Foos 
& Company v. Stover Manufacturing Company, the petitioner argued that the 
Seventh Circuit had erred in deciding not to follow the decision of the Eighth 
Circuit on an issue of patent enforcement.201  In a short opinion issued in 1900, 
the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision to 
split from the Eighth Circuit.202  “Comity,” the Court reasoned, “is not a rule of 
law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency.”203  Rather, “the primary 
duty of every court is to dispose of cases according to the law and the facts; in 
a word, to decide them right.”204  Deference comes into play only where “there 
may be a doubt as to the soundness of [the judge’s] views” such that “a 
uniformity of ruling to avoid confusion” would be preferable “until a higher 
court has settled the law.”205  The Court made clear that “no one” should 
 
198. Vestal, supra note 82, at 130–31.  
199. Id.; see also id. at 136–37 (identifying a minority of circuit courts that, after the advent of 
the court of appeals, deferred to prior decisions from other circuit courts for purposes of “comity, 
avoidance of confusion, time constraints of the courts, and a belief that if the circuit court were not to 
be followed, the circuit court of appeals should make that decision.”).  
200. Id. at 135 (quoting N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sanders, 47 F. 604 (C.C.D. Mont. 1891)).  As noted, 
some still propose this solution today.  See Thompson, supra note 165, at 494.  
201. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900). 
202. Id.  
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 488–89. 
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“abdicate his individual judgment” in a case based on a decision from a “co-
ordinate tribunal.”206  It is a mistake to overread Mast, Foos & Company as 
mandating circuit independence, as some suggest.207  But the decision, often 
paired with congressional maintenance of the regional circuits over time, can 
reasonably be read as support for a longstanding practice of treating decisions 
from other circuits as persuasive and not binding authority.208  
In a sense then, there are two sides of the law of the circuit as a legal 
concept.  One is the strict rule to follow prior panel decisions, while the other 
is the flexible approach to the decisions of other circuits: strict adherence, 
combined with balkanization.  One is not necessary for the other, and while our 
primary interest is the prior panel rule and conflicts, the circuits’ decisional 
independence is both relevant and important.  As others have recognized, the 
combination of these two aspects lays the groundwork for pervasive 
conflicts.209  Freeing each circuit to consider an issue according to the facts and 
context of each case—to “decide them right,” as the Supreme Court 
encouraged210—predictably results in disagreements among the circuits.211  But 
it is the other side, the strict prior panel rule, that gives conflicts their rigid and 
yet unstable character.212  Rather than enabling a dialogue between the 
disagreeing circuits, the strict rule effectively locks each side of the 
disagreement into place.  In this way, conflicts are persistent and rigid; 
accumulating cases—maybe even settling on a best practice—but unable to 
 
206. Id. at 489. 
207. Compare Dragich, supra note 39, at 584 (stating that Mast, Foos & Co., 177 U.S. 485, 
adopted a “rule of comity”), with Mast, Foos & Co., 177 U.S. at 488 (“Comity is not a rule”). 
208. See, e.g., Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A 
Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1094–95 (2017) (“Congress was aware that dividing 
the courts of appeals into regional circuits would create disuniformity, and thus a lack of intercircuit 
stare decisis was foreseeable, perhaps even inevitable, from the structure of the regional circuits.  This 
policy choice was explicitly recognized in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing 
Co. . . .  [H]owever, Congress created and maintained a system without intercircuit stare decisis . . . .”). 
209. Baker & McFarland, supra note 127, at 1407 (“The concept of the ‘law of the circuit,’ 
sometimes called the rule of interpanel accord, obliges a panel of circuit judges to treat as binding 
precedent earlier decisions of that same court of appeals, absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court 
action.  Decisions of other courts of appeals, however, are deemed merely persuasive.  This practice 
weakens the theory of one national law.”). 
210. See Mast, Foos & Co., 117 U.S. at 488.  
211. Berger, supra note 208, at 1094. 
212. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 566 (“The so-called rule of interpanel accord solidifies the 
law of the circuit by requiring greater deference to decisions of other panels within the same circuit 
than to panel (or even en banc) decisions of other circuits.”). 
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fully resolve the conflict without costly and unlikely intervention by the 
Supreme Court or en banc court.  Yet this rigidity does not mean that conflicts 
are also stable.  Rather, regional variations in the law of the circuit doctrine 
itself mean that the same change in the law can cause different changes in 
different circuits, sometimes inadvertently.  The result is a rigid yet unstable 
scheme that, among other problems, hinders the courts of appeals from adopting 
a uniform approach to an issue through dialogue and collective experience.   
2.  Unpublished Opinions 
Another innovation of this period was the practice of issuing 
nonprecedential or unpublished opinions.  The history, merits, and use of 
nonprecedential or unpublished opinions in the courts of appeals is extensively 
covered elsewhere.213  My goal here is to distinguish the adoption of 
nonpublication policies, and vigorous debate about unpublished opinions, from 
the development of the law of the circuit doctrine.  This is a necessary aside 
because the development of the law of the circuit doctrine is sometimes credited 
to the adoption of nonpublication policies.214  The practice of distinguishing 
between precedential and nonprecedential decisions wouldn’t be meaningful, 
the thinking goes, unless the precedential decisions bound future panels.215  But 
this thinking is likely a mistake for two reasons. 
First, nonpublication policies were adopted after the development of the 
law of the circuit doctrine in at least some circuits.216  General concerns with 
the “avalanche of decisional law” published by the federal courts have existed 
for the entire twentieth century, but there was no unified attempt to limit 
 
213. See generally, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal 
Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2002) (giving 
context to Rule 32.1); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules, 
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287 (2001) (discussing history and merits of nonpublication policies); 
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 171, at 1168 (an earlier example); Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About 
Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1429 (2005) (discussing the adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1).  
214. See Mead, supra note 27, at 796 (“Although it is not precisely clear what sparked the 
change, it can probably be attributed to the confluence of two phenomena: an increase in the number 
of cases and judges, and the birth of limited publication practices.”). 
215. Id. (“the ability of a panel to explicitly endorse an opinion as ‘published’ enhanced the 
decision’s status: not only in symbolic effect, but by limiting the number of precedents entitled to 
heightened deference and by signaling that the precedent is the product of some heightened attention 
by the deciding judges.”). 
216. Id. at 798–99; Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 213, at 291–92. 
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publication of federal appellate decisions until the 1970s.217  In 1964, the 
Judicial Conference recommended that the courts of appeals only publish 
decisions of “general precedential value,” to assuage the “increasing practical 
difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining private and public 
law library facilities.”218  Recognizing a “widespread consensus that too many 
opinions are being printed or published or otherwise disseminated” in 1971, the 
Federal Judicial Center requested in 1972 that each circuit develop a policy for 
issuing unpublished decisions and, importantly, prohibiting citation to those 
opinions.219  By 1974, every circuit had adopted rules authorizing unpublished 
decisions and prohibiting citation of those decisions—although the rules varied 
considerably.220  While it’s hard to draw clear conclusions, the law of the circuit 
doctrine seems to have developed before then in at least some circuits—around 
the 1950s and 1960s—and was “solidif[ying]” in the circuits by the time 
nonpublication policies were solicited by the Federal Judicial Center.221 
Second, this thinking conflates a court’s ability to designate some decisions 
as nonprecedential with a separate issue about how the court will treat its 
precedential decisions.  The law of the circuit doctrine mandates how a court 
will treat its full-blown precedent—with strict adherence as opposed to a 
flexible approach.  Nonpublication policies allow courts to designate some 
opinions as something less than full-blown precedent.  One is not required for 
the other.  For example, a court of appeals that has a flexible approach to its 
full-blown precedent could still have a policy of designating some of its 
decisions as nonprecedential in order to spend less time and judicial effort on 
those decisions.  And the opposite could be true: a court of appeals that views 
all of its decisions as having some precedential value could still have a rule that 
prohibits later panels from revisiting a category of precedential decisions—that 
appears to be the case in the D.C. Circuit.222  The law of the circuit doctrine and 
 
217. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 171, at 1169–70; see also David R. Cleveland, 
Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 84 (2009) (“the first rumblings about limiting citation began in the Third 
and Fifth Circuits in the 1940s.”). 
218. Cleveland, supra note 217, at 84–85. 
219. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 171, at 1169–70. 
220. Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 213, at 292. 
221. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the 
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 580 (1969) (noting that the law of 
the circuit as having “emerged”); Mead, supra note 27, at 796.  
222. Compare D.C. CIR. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B) (“All unpublished orders or judgments of this court, 
including explanatory memoranda (but not including sealed dispositions), entered on or after January 
 
SASSMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2020  9:23 PM 
1434 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1401 
   
 
nonpublication policies deal with similar but independent issues, and one is not 
a necessary result of the other. 
Confusion between the two is likely a result of the debate over citation to 
unpublished decisions in the 2000s, which raised larger issues about precedent 
in the courts of appeals.223  Again, this debate is covered extensively 
elsewhere.224  Two limited takeaways should suffice for our purposes here.  The 
first is that the debate over unpublished opinions occurred in the shadow of the 
law of the circuit doctrine, not the other way around.  For example, the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in Hart v. Massanari featured prominently in this debate and 
argued that nonpublication policies were necessary because of the strictures of 
the law of the circuit doctrine.225  This further emphasizes that the law of the 
circuit doctrine was never in doubt during the debate over unpublished 
opinions, and suggests that, if anything, the law of the circuit doctrine has had 
an influence on the maintenance of nonpublication policies rather than the 
opposite.  
The second takeaway is that the debate over unpublished decisions largely 
exhausted observers on the more difficult questions about nonprecedential 
opinions that could genuinely implicate the law of the circuit doctrine.  One 
primary account of the debate over unpublished opinions suggests that judges 
resisted citation to unpublished decisions so vigorously because they feared the 
change would raise deeper concerns about the practice of issuing 
nonprecedential opinions.226  “[J]udges view unpublished opinions with 
discomfort or even embarrassment.”227  Prohibiting citation to these decisions 
 
1, 2002, may be cited as precedent.”), with LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(noting that “One three-judge panel, therefore, does not have the authority to overrule another three-
judge panel of the court.”).  See also D.C. CIR. R. 36(e)(2) (“a panel’s decision to issue an unpublished 
disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.”) (emphasis added). 
223. Barnett, supra note 213, at 21; Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 213, at 289; Schiltz, supra 
note 213, at 1458. 
224. See generally, e.g., Barnett, supra note 213; Schiltz, supra note 213. 
225. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Faced with the prospect of parties 
citing these dispositions as precedent, conscientious judges would have to pay much closer attention 
to the way they word their unpublished rulings.”); see also Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: 
A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 625 (2009) (“Other judges confirm 
that the use of unpublished opinions enables them to devote less time to those latter opinions and to 
hastily resolve certain cases, and they acknowledge that unpublished opinions do not receive the same 
scrutiny as published opinions.”). 
226. Schiltz, supra note 213, at 1489. 
227. Id. 
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would ensure that they do not come back to “haunt” the judges.228  Removing 
that barrier may, judges feared, bring a reckoning with the practice of issuing 
nonprecedential decisions themselves.229  But no such reckoning has 
happened—both the law of the circuit doctrine and nonpublication practices 
operate largely as they had before the debate.  
Others have drawn connections between nonpublication practices and the 
law of the circuit, but nothing causal.  For example, Amy Sloan has suggested 
that the dominance of unpublished decisionmaking in the courts of appeals has 
“eroded” the law of the circuit doctrine “beyond recognition.”230  But, by the 
same token, the dominance of unpublished decisionmaking has amplified the 
lock-in effect of published decisions.  All circuits will publish, as a matter of 
practice, decisions that create, implicate, or resolve conflicts.231  
Counterintuitively then, judges avoid unpublished decisions in conflict cases, 
where issues are in the greatest flux, in favor of a more rigid tool to solidify 
them.   
To sum, growing federal caseloads resulted in a structural compromise 
embodied by the courts of appeals: create independent intermediate courts to 
decide most appeals, while freeing the Supreme Court to focus its efforts on 
maintaining uniformity and stability in federal law.  Over time, the effects of 
still-growing federal caseloads have again and again disrupted this balance, 
resulting in the courts of appeals’ greater independence over the development 
of federal law while undermining the Supreme Court’s capacity to maintain 
uniformity.  The Supreme Court’s continued focus on resolving conflicts in this 
context negatively influences the operation and effectiveness of the federal 
courts and has long prompted calls for reform.  Most prior proposals have 
 
228. Jessie Allen, Just Words?  The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals, 
29 VT. L. REV. 555, 570 (2005) (“No-citation rules guarantee that the hastily reviewed language of 
summary opinions will not come back to haunt judges in future cases.”); Schiltz, supra note 213, at 
1490 (“Seventh Circuit judges refer to the citation of their own official actions [unpublished opinions] 
as ‘throwing’ those actions ‘back in their faces.’”) (original alteration omitted). 
229. Schiltz, supra note 213, at 1483 (“Many judges likely pushed strongly against Rule 32.1 for 
the same reason:  They, too, expect—or at least fear—that Rule 32.1 will be the first step down a 
slippery slope that will lead to judges being required to issue published precedential opinions in all 
cases.”). 
230. Sloan, Stealth Procedures, supra note 39, at 752. 
231. See DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF 
ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 37 (1985), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Unpblshd.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4NT-8BF5] (noting that 
“all” circuits “publish a decision that resolves or creates conflict in the law”).  
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focused on reforming the Supreme Court rather than looking for opportunities 
for reform in the practices of the courts of appeals.  While the Supreme Court 
was shrinking its docket, the courts of appeals were also developing ad hoc 
tools to help them manage their increasing decisional independence, such as the 
law of the circuit doctrine.  This doctrine plays an underappreciated role in 
generating and perpetuating conflicts, making it a potential candidate for reform 
to help address the negative influences conflicts have on the federal courts.  The 
next Part will therefore critically assess the purposes of the law of the circuit 
doctrine to contextualize possible reforms.  
III.  THE PURPOSES OF THE LAW OF THE CIRCUIT DOCTRINE 
As others have recognized, the law of the circuit doctrine’s purpose is “not 
precisely clear.”232  The early cases stating the rule do not explain where the 
rule comes from or why courts adopted it.233  Some courts describe the rule as 
a “tradition” without noting when or why it began.234  Most scholars who have 
written about the doctrine have not questioned its origins or interrogated its 
purposes.235  Among those that have, most note that the doctrine arose as a 
response to growing federal caseloads.236  Within that broad category, scholars 
and judges have offered competing narratives and a variety of institutional 
values that the law of the circuit doctrine advances.237  
This Part collects these explanations into three categories and critically 
assesses them.  The first category considers explanations that the law of the 
circuit doctrine is necessary for uniformity, in particular uniformity within a 
 
232. Mead, supra note 27, at 796.  
233. See id.; see also Kannan, supra note 39 at 756 (“The decisions applying the interpanel rule 
have not clearly articulated their legal bases.”). 
234. See, e.g., Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984) (“It is the 
tradition of this court that reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels.”) (quoting the 
Internal Operating Procedures of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Chapter 8.C.). 
235. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 540.  
236. See Mead, supra note 27, at 796 (“[the doctrine] can probably be attributed to the confluence 
of two phenomena: an increase in the number of cases and judges, and the birth of limited publication 
practices.”); John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive 
Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 127 (2006) (suggesting that the doctrine “is largely a product 
of the past thirty years’ mounting caseloads.”).  
237. Compare, e.g., Baker, Alternative Futures, supra note 152, at 959 (suggesting that the law 
of the circuit developed because en banc hearings were too costly), with Carrington, supra note 221, 
at 580–81 (“The ‘law of the circuit’ has emerged as a response to the Supreme Court’s incapacity to 
resolve intracircuit conflicts,” and suggesting that en banc proceedings are “now usually employed” 
when the law of the circuit fails). 
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circuit’s decisions, to support stability in the law and fairness to litigants.  The 
second category considers arguments that the doctrine helps make judicial 
decisionmaking more efficient.  The third category considers the doctrine’s role 
in generating and perpetuating conflicts, and its role enabling the Supreme 
Court’s “percolation” approach to certiorari.    
This Part serves two purposes.  First, it fills a gap in scholarship by 
collecting the various rationales given for the law of the circuit doctrine in one 
place.  As far as I am aware, this is the first comprehensive and critical analysis 
of the doctrine’s purposes.  Second, this analysis contributes an important 
framework for my proposal in Part IV.  Thus far, we’ve discussed the structural 
costs imposed by pervasive conflicts and the Supreme Court’s focus on 
conflicts, as well as the law of the circuit’s role in perpetuating those problems.  
Awareness of the doctrine’s institutional purposes helps tailor potential 
reforms.   
A.  Uniformity  
The most common justification for the law of the circuit doctrine is that the 
rule is necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions within a circuit—so-called 
intracircuit uniformity.238  This concern is generally tied to an increasing 
number of appellate judges in light of increasing caseloads.239  More judges on 
the same court deciding more cases means more disagreements, the thinking 
goes, so a rule is needed to keep things uniform.240  Defenders argue that strictly 
 
238. See, e.g., Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985 (1st Cir. 1986) (“Uniformity of decisions 
within a multi-panel circuit can only be achieved by strict adherence to prior circuit precedent, with 
the error-correcting function reserved to the court sitting en banc.”); Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. 
Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 452 
(2019) (“The prior-panel rule exists in large part to avoid intra-circuit conflict so that district judges in 
the circuit will know the ‘law of the circuit,’ thereby easing their decisionmaking process.”); Dragich, 
supra note 39, at 568 (“As the courts of appeals grew, the need to maintain intracircuit uniformity 
‘prompted the invention of the law of the circuit and en banc procedure.’”). 
239. Dragich, supra note 39, at 568; Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at the 
Crossroads: Adapt or Lose!, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 211, 254 (1994) (“Large courts of appeal present too 
great an opportunity for producing law of the panel rather than law of the circuit.”).  
240. Becker, supra note 153, at 344 (the law of the circuit “is a qualitative matter, founded upon 
the notion that only when the judges are able to master circuit law can they sufficiently and with 
necessary celerity engage each other substantively.  When the circuit gets too large, quality suffers.”); 
Mead, supra note 27, at 796 (“Moreover, the increase in the number of judges tended to make the 
courts less cohesive, and increased the likelihood of strong disagreements between panels.”).  
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mandating uniformity within a circuits’ decisions encourages stability, 
predictability, and fairness to litigants.241  
The main problem facing these justifications is why intracircuit uniformity 
(consistency within a circuit) should outweigh intercircuit uniformity 
(consistency between circuits).  As has been noted, “intracircuit uniformity 
comes at the expense of intercircuit conflicts.”242  And given the mobility and 
breadth of modern life, there’s good reason to think that conflicts between 
circuits could undermine the benefits achieved by avoiding conflicts within a 
circuit.243  Many peoples’ lives and endeavors are not constrained within a 
single geographic circuit, so conflicts among circuits likely undermine the 
stability or fairness sought by maintaining uniformity within a circuit.244  
Likewise, uniformity within a circuit doesn’t necessarily make the law 
more clear because the Supreme Court could always change the law of any 
circuit—and it could do so inadvertently, such as when the Court’s decision 
undermines the reasoning of a decision in a circuit that considers such 
undermining a sufficient “change in the law” to revisit their precedent.245  This 
is particularly important when the law of the circuit locks-in a conflict, since 
the conflict destabilizes both circuits’ precedent by increasing the (albeit low) 
likelihood of Supreme Court intervention.246  
 
241. See, e.g., Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 945 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (“The orderly development of the law, the need 
for stability, the value of results being predictable over time, and the importance of evenhanded justice 
all counsel continued fidelity to this principle.”); see also Gerald Bard Tjoflat, The Federal Judiciary: 
A Scarce Resource, 27 CONN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1995) (“The clarity and stability of the rule of law in 
a circuit depends on the number of judges pronouncing the rule.”). 
242. Dragich, supra note 39, at 568. 
243. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817, 855–56 (1994) (“only the truly sedentary can expect to avoid potential application 
of the law of other circuits”); Todd J. Tiberi, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: 
Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 885 (1993) (“It would be difficult to argue 
that contemporary society is less mobile than the relatively stationary society of the nineteenth or mid-
twentieth centuries.  Perhaps the law of the circuit was acceptable when society was immobile, and 
people and businesses rarely ventured outside their home circuit.”). 
244. See Caminker, supra note 243, at 855–56; Tiberi, supra note 243, at 885. 
245. See United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 226–29 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing circuits’ 
response to Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)); see also Caminker, supra note 243, at 
866 (“[A]gainst a backdrop of intercircuit divergence, only one of the uniformity values—
predictability—clearly supports a rigid ‘law of the circuit,’ and then only in certain contexts.”). 
246. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 256 (1st ed. 1985) 
(noting that “whenever there is a conflict between two circuits, the law of both circuits is unstable 
because the Supreme Court is likely sooner or later to intervene.”). 
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Moreover, valuing intracircuit over intercircuit uniformity encourages 
forum shopping and increased litigation.247  Parties with interests in various 
circuits may relitigate an issue in other circuits, further undermining stability.248  
To the extent we value uniformity somewhere, intercircuit uniformity may well 
be a better steward of stability and fairness than intracircuit uniformity given 
the current context and realities of the federal courts.249 
But even assuming that uniformity of decision within a circuit is valuable, 
it’s not clear that the law of the circuit doctrine is particularly effective at 
achieving that goal.  The en banc rehearing process is expressly designed to 
resolve conflicts within a court of appeals’ decisions.250  And as en banc review 
has become so “unwieldy” that it “is now seldom used,” the strict law of the 
circuit doctrine has, as best we can tell, not proved effective at avoiding 
intracircuit conflicts in its place.251  Inconsistency within a circuit’s decisions 
has generally been seen as a widespread problem since the 1990s, well after the 
law of the circuit doctrine took hold—although, as with intercircuit conflicts, 
there is debate about the actual scope and effect of intracircuit conflicts.252  At 
 
247. Rebecca Hanner White, Time for A New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard 
the “Law of the Circuit” When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 
69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 679 (1991) (“Adherence to the law of the circuit, moreover, promotes forum 
shopping.”); cf. Frost, supra note 18, at 1602 (“As long as both parties have the latitude to argue for 
their favored forum, however, there is nothing wrong with each attempting to have the case heard 
where they prefer—whether because it is more convenient, the jury or judges seem more sympathetic, 
or the law in that circuit is more favorable.”). 
248. See, e.g., White, supra note 247, at 641 (discussing agency relitigation and nonacquisence 
with circuit law). 
249. See Caminker, supra note 243, at 855 (noting that “a rigid rule of intracircuit 
precedent . . . appreciably undermines the values of efficient public law administration, equal 
treatment, and respect for judicial authority; intracircuit uniformity can do little to compensate.  Rather, 
the only uniformity value the rule of intracircuit precedent promotes is some predictability within a 
circuit’s territorial boundaries.”); Dragich, supra note 39, at 587–88 (advocating for intercircuit stare 
decisis). 
250. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).  
251. See Caminker, supra note 243, at 855 n.161 (“Indeed, a rule of intracircuit precedent does 
not necessarily produce a uniform law within a circuit.”); Dragich, supra note 39, at 566–67 (noting 
that en banc procedures are “now seldom used” and other “existing mechanisms to unify law within a 
circuit are also of questionable efficacy.”). 
252. Compare, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice 
of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 543 (1989) [hereinafter Hellman, 
Jumboism] (“The court of appeals has embarked on an ambitious program to maintain consistency in 
its decisions, but among lawyers and district judges, the perception is widespread that inconsistency 
remains a major problem.”), with id. at 600 (“Occasional inconsistencies in panel decisions may be a 
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the very least, conflicts within a circuit’s precedent arise with enough regularity 
that many circuits have developed yet another rule to navigate the problem: the 
earlier panel decision controls.253  
Some circuits have also made other changes to their rules or procedures 
after the rise of the law of the circuit doctrine that may be better suited to 
avoiding intracircuit conflicts.  For example, several circuits have amended 
their rules to make en banc review easier, either through rehearings with less 
than the full court or by allowing panels to overrule prior decisions after 
circulating the new decision to the full court.254  Although limited, a study by 
Arthur Hellman suggested that the Ninth Circuit had effectively avoided serious 
intracircuit conflicts at least in part because of internal procedures that better 
informed panel judges of prior decisions on issues and allowed for input from 
other judges on the circuit before issuing the panel decision.255  At bottom, there 
is not much support that the rule requiring strict adherence to prior decisions—
separate from en banc review or other procedures for input from other judges 
on the circuit—meaningfully helps maintain uniformity within a circuit’s 
decisions.   
Some also argue that the law of the circuit doctrine is a necessary result of 
en banc procedures, which, in turn, are necessary for maintaining uniformity in 
the circuit’s decisions.256  More strident versions of this argument suggest that 
 
small price to pay when judged against” structural changes to the federal judiciary, such as creating a 
national court of appeals).  See also, e.g., Becker, supra note 153, at 344–45 (“[A]lthough I understand 
that Professor Hellman’s study reflects that there is consistency and coherence in Ninth Circuit 
jurisprudence, I must tell you that the private reports I get from judges who are on or have sat with the 
Ninth Circuit are quite different.”). 
253. See, e.g., Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen circuit 
authority is in conflict, a panel should look to the line of authority containing the earliest case, because 
a decision of a prior panel cannot be overturned by a later panel.); see also Michael Duvall, Resolving 
Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 17, 20 (2009) (collecting 
cases) (“In most federal courts of appeal, resolution of an intra-circuit split is straightforward: the 
earliest decision controls”). 
254. See Mead, supra note 27, at 797.  
255. Hellman, Jumboism, supra note 252, at 547–48 (discussing procedures), 600 (noting that 
judges “spend a substantial amount of time reviewing opinions and exchanging memoranda in order 
to iron out apparent inconsistencies without calling an en banc hearing.”). 
256. See, e.g., Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc: Half Full, or Half Empty?, 48 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 317, 319–20 (2006) (“Of course, three-judge panels regularly speak for the court as whole, 
and their decisions settle most of the law of the circuit.  But decisions by three-judge panels are 
generally accepted and regarded as authoritative because the full court is there as a backstop.”). 
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the law of the circuit doctrine can be derived from legislation.257  These 
arguments mostly stem from an ambiguity in the 1911 Judiciary Act, which 
stated—as the Evarts Act had—that a “court of appeals . . . shall consist of three 
judges.”258  But then authorized four judges in some circuits.259  The courts of 
appeals simply began sitting in panels of three circuit judges, mirroring practice 
in the courts since the Evarts Act, and Congress kept adding circuit judges over 
time.260  In 1940, the Third and Ninth Circuits split over whether a court of 
appeals was statutorily authorized to decide a case en banc given that the 1911 
Act said that the courts “shall consist” of three judges.261  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, and in a case known as Textile Mills, endorsed en banc 
procedures.262  Some have pointed to this endorsement in Textile Mills as the 
basis of the law of the circuit doctrine.263  
These arguments over-read Textile Mills.  The Court’s primary findings 
were that neither the text nor legislative history of the 1911 Act prohibited the 
courts of appeals from sitting en banc.264  Although the Court found the 
 
257. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“the law-of-the-circuit 
doctrine is derived from legislation and from the structure of the federal courts of appeals.”) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 46(c)).  But see Amy E. Sloan, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 936 (2008) 
[hereinafter Sloan, Pragmatic Approach] (“Although statutes and procedural rules directed toward the 
en banc procedure recognize the law of the circuit rule, no statute or rule establishes the law of the 
circuit rule or mandates its application.”); Thompson, supra note 165, at 500 n.191 (“The source of the 
prevailing rule in the courts of appeals is not clear, but it is not from an act of Congress.”). 
258. Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231, § 117, 36 Stat. 1131.  
259. Id. § 118. 
260. See White Commission Report, supra note 166, at 62 (“Three-judge panels in federal 
appellate courts are a legacy of the three-judge appellate courts created by the 1891 Evarts Act.”); id. 
at 13 (“As they grew, the courts began to sit in more than one panel of three, convening occasionally 
en banc, a practice approved by the Supreme Court and then codified in the 1940s.”). 
261. Compare Comm’r v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 70–71 (3d Cir. 1940), with 
Lang’s Estate v. Comm’r, 97 F.2d 867, 869–70 (9th Cir. 1938). 
262. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 334–35 (1941). 
263. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (citing Textile Mills, 314 U.S. 326); 
Dragich, supra note 39, at 565–66 (“The result in Textile Mills led to the development of the law of 
the circuit doctrine.  Although the Textile Mills opinion does not say so, the import of that decision is 
to allow the court of appeals in each circuit to control the development of the law of that circuit.”).  Cf. 
Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 
YALE L.J. 677, 686 (1984) (“Congress may never have intended that the concept of law of the circuit 
develop, but something of the sort was inevitable because the Evarts Act directed each court of appeals 
to interpret federal law independently.”). 
264. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 334–35. 
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interpretive problem “beset with difficult[y],” it concluded that the ambiguity 
was probably inadvertent and so en banc decisionmaking should be allowed 
because the practice “makes for more effective judicial administration.”265  
“Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided” and finality promoted, the Court 
reasoned, by enabling the full court to weigh in on an issue—a valuable 
consideration “in view of the fact that in our federal judicial system these courts 
are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases.”266  Seven years later, 
Congress codified that the courts of appeals can make decisions in panels or en 
banc.267  
At best, Textile Mills endorses the en banc court’s role in maintaining 
intracircuit uniformity; the decision makes no endorsement or connection to 
strict adherence to prior panel decisions.268  And there is nothing about the 
practice of sitting as a whole court, or the principle that intracircuit conflicts 
should be avoided, that necessarily mandates strict adherence to prior panel 
decisions.  Panels could, for example, maintain a flexible approach to its prior 
panel decisions while treating en banc decisions as strictly binding, higher 
authority.  Such a tiered approach would be more consistent with readings of 
Textile Mills that say the en banc court holds ultimate authority over the 
circuit’s precedent than the current doctrine that gives both panel decisions and 
en banc decisions equal weight.  
Moreover, the courts of appeals themselves maintained competing visions 
of how to treat their prior decisions after the codification of en banc procedures 
in the 1940s, as the law of the circuit doctrine “solidified.”269  While the 
 
265. Id. at 333–35. 
266. Id. at 335. 
267. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 46, 62 Stat. 869, 871–72 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 46(b)–(c) (2006)); see also United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689–90, 
(1960) (reiterating the values of en banc procedures noted in Textile Mills when considering whether 
retired judges could sit with a court of appeals en banc).  
268. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 333–35. 
269. See Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The most complex 
relationship is between a court and its own previous decisions.  A court must give considerable weight 
to those decisions unless and until they have been overruled or undermined by the decisions of a higher 
court, or other supervening developments, such as a statutory overruling.  But it is not absolutely bound 
by them, and must give fair consideration to any substantial argument that a litigant makes for 
overruling a previous decision.”); N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1045 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(“The mere fact that a prior opinion exists is not sufficient in itself to call the doctrine of stare decisis 
into play: otherwise one rogue opinion could deprive the law of the accumulated expertise that stare 
decisis strives to safeguard.  If the rule of interpanel accord serves a purpose different from that of stare 
decisis, its purpose must be to allocate decisionmaking power between coequal panels subject to 
reversal by the Court of Appeals en banc.”). 
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Supreme Court’s endorsement of en banc decisionmaking does suggest that the 
Court and Congress expected the courts of appeals to be maintaining their own 
lines of precedent—developing their own “law of the circuit” in the broader 
sense—there is no indication that either the Court or Congress intended the 
courts of appeals to adopt a strict rule of adhering to prior decision as part of 
that process.  To attribute the law of the circuit doctrine either to congressional 
action or the Supreme Court’s blessing of en banc decisionmaking in Textile 
Mills seems to be a mistake.  
To sum up, the law of the circuit’s role in promoting uniformity within a 
circuit’s decisions is a common justification that should be narrowed in a 
modern context.  The doctrine’s prioritization of intracircuit over intercircuit 
uniformity threatens to undermine many of the values associated with 
intracircuit uniformity.  This threat presents itself most clearly in conflict cases, 
where the doctrine’s strict adherence to prior decisions locks-in a conflict that 
destabilizes both circuits’ precedent and encourages further litigation in other 
circuits.  Neither congressional nor Supreme Court action clearly mandates the 
rule, as some argue,270 and circuits have developed other, more flexible tools—
such as relaxed en banc procedures or other internal checks—that, based on 
limited experience, appear effective at maintaining intracircuit uniformity.  By 
contrast, any uniformity benefits offered by the strict law of the circuit doctrine 
come with clear costs, some of which could be mitigated by relaxing the rule in 
conflict cases.     
B.  Efficiency  
Another set of arguments is that the law of the circuit doctrine improves 
judicial efficiency by reducing the time or effort needed to make decisions.271  
One initial problem with these justifications is that commenters will sometimes 
not distinguish between the benefits of the law of the circuit doctrine and 
nonpublication policies when discussing decisionmaking efficiency.272  This is 
 
270. Mead, supra note 27, at 794. 
271. See, e.g., White, supra note 247, at 682 (arguing that relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine 
would cause “an increase in judicial workload,” reasoning “”[w]hen a panel is not bound by circuit law 
but is expected to examine an issue for itself, courts will expend additional time and energy” on cases).  
272. See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 236, at 128 (“Screening systems suppress reevaluation by fast-
tracking later like cases [controlled by circuit precedent]—indeed, this is what makes strict rules of the 
law of the circuit appealing as an efficiency device.”); Charles R. Wilson, How Opinions Are 
Developed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 32 STETSON L. REV. 247, 
257 (2003) (“Given the tremendous volume of appeals docketed in the Eleventh Circuit, efficiency 
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important because the efficiency benefits of nonpublication policies appear to 
be significant, and as discussed above, the doctrine and nonpublication policies 
are not necessarily linked to one another.273  At least one study shows that the 
adoption of nonpublication policies, along with a reduction in oral arguments, 
have had the greatest effect on reducing decision times in the courts of 
appeals.274  And specific aspects of nonpublication policies—namely, the 
ability to create a second-class of nonprecedential decisions that require less 
judicial attention—closely match statements from judges about changes that 
improve decisionmaking efficiency in light of growing caseloads.275  By 
contrast, the law of the circuit doctrine’s connection to reducing the time and 
effort on decisions is more subtle, since the doctrine concerns the weight given 
to precedential decisions—absolute rather than persuasive.  Courts could enjoy 
most, if not all, of the benefits associated with nonpublication policies even if 
they did not strictly adhere to prior decisions.  It is important, therefore, not to 
attribute the efficiency benefits of nonpublication policies with the law of the 
circuit doctrine.  
That said, there are two efficiency arguments targeted at the unique role of 
the law of the circuit doctrine.  The first argument is that strict rules of precedent 
makes decisions easier because the judge does not have to reconsider the merits 
 
necessitates that judges devote their time most significantly to writing opinions in those cases that 
involve issues of first impression and development of the common law of this Circuit, that will create 
conflict with another circuit, that involve issues of continuing public concern, and that modify or clarify 
the law of this Circuit.”); see also Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the 
Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 26 (2000) (cautioning against conflating efficiency 
justifications with precedential arguments).  
273. See supra Section II.C.2.  
274. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Effectiveness of Measures to Increase 
Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 415, 441–42 (1988) (“The 
most effective procedural changes are those that reduce the burden of writing and publishing 
opinions.”).  To be sure, commenters debate the efficiency of nonpublication policies.  See, e.g., 
Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, 
and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 125 (1995) (noting that “[t]he critical assumption 
underlying the efficiency rationale in favor of nonpublication is that judges are able to determine in 
advance which opinions will be valuable to future litigants,” and questioning judges’ ability to predict 
well). 
275. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While federal courts of 
appeals generally lack discretionary review authority, they use their authority to decide cases by 
unpublished—and nonprecedential—dispositions to achieve the same end: They select a manageable 
number of cases in which to publish precedential opinions, and leave the rest to be decided by 
unpublished dispositions or judgment orders.”).  
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of the issue—the judge simply relies on the prior case and is done.276  This 
argument is often made in support of precedent generally, reflecting Justice 
Cardozo’s proverb that “the labor of judges would be increased almost to the 
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case.”277  
Therefore, the strict rule improves efficiency, one might argue, over a flexible 
approach.  
I am skeptical.  When assessing this argument, it’s helpful to distinguish 
between the perspectives of district courts and the courts of appeals.  For the 
district courts, it’s important to recognize that the law of the circuit doctrine is 
a rule of horizontal precedent—it addresses how future panels of the courts of 
appeals should treat the decisions of prior panels.278  The district courts’ 
obligation to follow circuit decisions is a separate rule of vertical precedent.  
Relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine—saying, for example, that future panels 
in new cases can reconsider prior panel decisions—does not necessarily mean 
that district courts can question prior panel decisions.  Therefore, relaxing the 
law of the circuit would not necessarily decrease decisionmaking efficiency in 
the district courts.279  Likewise, the law of the circuit doctrine does not itself 
guide district courts if there is a conflict within a circuit’s decisions—a separate 
rule does: the earlier decision controls.280  As with nonpublication policies, you 
could have the earlier-decision rule without a strict rule binding future panels 
of the court of appeals to prior panel decisions.281  All told, it’s hard to imagine 
 
276. See Douglas & Solimine, supra note 238, at 452 (“[I]f the initial appellate panel is faithful 
to the prior-panel rule, it will necessarily reverse a district judge that rules contrary to prior circuit 
caselaw.  This leads to greater efficiency for both the district court and the initial circuit court panel 
(not to mention the litigants).”); Caminker, supra note 243, at 867 (“One can still justify a blanket duty 
to obey the ‘law of the circuit’ by extolling other virtues of bright-line rules, such as efficiency 
(‘freeing’ the district court from having to weigh the relative merits of obedience and autonomy in a 
given case).”). 
277. White, supra note 247, at 672 (quoting Cardozo in this context); see also, e.g., Frederick 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987) (“When a precedent has no decisional 
significance as a precedent, the conscientious decisionmaker must look at each case in its own fullness.  
But when a rule external to the decisionmaker compels reliance on the decisions of others, it frees the 
decisionmaker from these responsibilities.”). 
278. Mead, supra note 27, at 790. 
279. Contra Caminker, supra note 243, at 867 (justifying the law of the circuit because it 
“‘free[s]’ the district court from having to weigh the relative merits of obedience and autonomy in a 
given case”).  
280. See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir. 2003). 
281. For example, the Eighth Circuit applies the strict law of the circuit doctrine, but not a rule 
that the earlier panel decision controls in an intracircuit conflict.  See Williams v. Nat’l Football 
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how the strict law of the circuit doctrine improves the district court’s efficiency 
in finding and applying the controlling precedent.    
This first argument makes more sense from the perspective of the courts of 
appeals, though likely quite a bit more narrow than advocates suggest.  
Advocates argue that the strict law of the circuit doctrine makes it easier for a 
later panel to come to a decision, which in turn expedites affirmance or 
reversal.282  But this argument depends on how much decisionmaking effort is 
saved after finding the relevant decisions and determining whether they are on-
point enough to be considered precedent.  These two initial tasks are time 
consuming and often the primary difficulty associated with applying 
precedent.283  The law of the circuit doctrine may save marginal time and effort 
once the decisionmaker has found and analyzed the precedent, but no one seems 
to have pursued this argument at that depth.     
The second efficiency argument casts the law of the circuit doctrine as a 
guard against time and resource intensive en banc proceedings.284  The 
argument is that the law of the circuit doctrine reduces the overall workload of 
the court by minimizing intracircuit conflicts and therefore minimizing the need 
for time consuming en banc decisionmaking.285  Although framed as an 
efficiency argument, it relies on the assumption that the law of the circuit 
actually achieves intracircuit uniformity, which, as we’ve discussed, is 
debatable.286   
At bottom, arguments that the law of the circuit promotes efficiency are 
limited.  It is important to distinguish the doctrine’s efficiency benefits from 
other related but independent policies, such as the recognized efficiency 
 
League, 598 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2009) (Colloton, J., dissenting) (“This circuit has a peculiar 
approach to conflicting prior panel opinions.  The prior panel rule emphatically holds that one panel of 
this Court is not at liberty to disregard a precedent handed down by another panel, but if a second panel 
violates this rule and deviates from circuit precedent, then subsequent panels are free to follow suit, 
and to disregard the original circuit precedent in favor of the second decision.”) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
282. See Douglas & Solimine, supra note 238 at 452 (arguing that greater clarity “leads to greater 
efficiency for both the district court and the initial circuit court panel (not to mention the litigants).”). 
283. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 277, at 591–95 (discussing difficulties regarding the 
application of precedent). 
284. See Baker, Alternative Futures, supra note 152, at 959 (“The en banc court evolved as a 
mechanism to preserve [consistency and control].  However, en banc rehearings result in considerable 
expense and delay, for litigants and courts alike.  Consequently, there developed a concept of the law 
of the circuit or the law of interpanel accord.”). 
285. Id.  
286. See supra Section III.A.  
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benefits of nonpublication policies or the clarity of a rule that the earlier 
decision controls when a district court faces an intracircuit conflict.  On its own, 
arguments that the law of the circuit doctrine makes appellate decisionmaking 
easier seem to narrow to the decisionmaking effort saved after the judge has 
identified relevant cases and determined whether they are sufficiently on-point 
to be considered precedent.  These steps make up a large part of the effort 
associated with precedent-based reasoning and would occur regardless of 
whether the circuit followed a strict or flexible approach to its prior decisions.  
The efficiency benefits of the doctrine alone may therefore be limited.  Relaxing 
the doctrine in conflict cases likewise might not impose a substantial burden on 
the courts both because of the limited number of conflict cases in the overall 
cases and because of the doctrine’s limited role in overall decisionmaking 
efficiency.  
C.  Percolation  
The law of the circuit doctrine’s role in supporting the Supreme Court’s 
percolation approach to certiorari is an underappreciated feature of the doctrine.  
Less common than efficiency and uniformity rationales, the law of the circuit 
doctrine’s role in generating and maintaining conflicts is sometimes raised 
dismissively or alongside criticism of the Supreme Court’s practice of denying 
certiorari in conflict cases to let an issue “percolate.”287  However, the law of 
the circuit doctrine’s structural history and current context suggest that the 
doctrine’s role in generating conflicts should be given more credit as a value.288  
The idea behind percolation is that the federal courts benefit from allowing 
competing decisions to accumulate on an issue before the Supreme Court 
 
287. See Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Circuit—A Requiem, 1985 DUKE L.J. 
690, 690 (noting that the law of the circuit doctrine provides “a pseudo-justification for deferring 
decisions on difficult issues while conflicting opinions accumulate in the courts of appeals.”).  
288. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 567 (“However inadequate existing mechanisms to promote 
intracircuit uniformity may be, the purported necessity of unifying law within each circuit frees circuit 
judges of the responsibility to assure uniformity more broadly.”); Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, 
A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
681, 698–99 (1984) (“In contrast, we believe that the federal judicial system—consisting, as it does, 
of several courts of appeals unbound by each other’s decisions—reveals in its very structure that a 
degree of conflict is desirable.”); White, supra note 247, at 672 (“The advantages of percolation and 
of providing the Supreme Court with different approaches to important issues are seen as outweighing 
an unavoidable loss of uniformity.”). 
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finally grants certiorari and resolves it.289  Advocates argue that percolation 
improves the Court’s ultimate decision by allowing it to review multiple 
perspectives.290  They also argue that percolation improves decisionmaking in 
the courts of appeals by allowing courts to consider the views of other 
circuits.291  And they argue that percolation forces the lower appellate courts to 
take their job more seriously, since their decisions may remain law for longer 
than necessary and their views may be seriously considered by the Supreme 
Court.292  Finally, advocates argue that percolation helps conserve the Court’s 
administrative and political capital by justifying its decision to wait to review 
certain issues.293  Percolation may also serve federalism values.294 
Though still debated,295 percolation is generally accepted by the federal 
appellate courts.  Supreme Court Justices will expressly cite the value of letting 
an issue percolate before taking up issues.296  And courts of appeals have 
endorsed percolation as an overall benefit of the multi-circuit system.297  
Percolation is a modern phenomenon.  There are references to the basic 
principles of percolation extending as far back as shortly after the Civil War, 
 
289. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 554–56 (discussing percolation); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower 
Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
457, 484–89 (2012) (same); Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 288, at 699 (same). 
290. See, e.g., Gewirtzman, supra note 289, at 482–83. 
291. Id. at 486. 
292. Id. at 484. 
293. Id. 
294. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 379 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“our practice 
of letting issues ‘percolate’ in the 50 States [is] in the interests of federalism”). 
295. Gewirtzman, supra note 289, at 484, 489 (noting advocates and critics of percolation in the 
judiciary).  
296. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These 
injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system—preventing legal questions from 
percolating through the federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and making every case a national 
emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch.”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems 
are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts 
may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”). 
297. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The courts of appeals, 
and even the lower courts of other circuits, may decline to follow the rule we announce—and often do.  
This ability to develop different interpretations of the law among the circuits is considered a strength 
of our system.  It allows experimentation with different approaches to the same legal problem, so that 
when the Supreme Court eventually reviews the issue it has the benefit of ‘percolation’ within the 
lower courts.”). 
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well before the creation of the courts of appeals.298  But the concept seems to 
have gained prominence much later in the twentieth century.  Some argue that 
there was clear shift in 1950 from Supreme Court’s practice from granting 
certiorari in conflict cases “as of course” to denying certiorari in conflict 
cases.299  By the 1980s, percolation was popular enough that it began showing 
up explicitly in Supreme Court opinions.300  
The law of the circuit doctrine plays an important role in enabling and 
supporting percolation.  Notably, percolation matches more closely with both 
sides of the doctrine—independent circuits, but strict adherence within a 
circuit—than the more common uniformity or efficiency rationales.  On one 
hand, each circuit’s independence allows them to come to differing and 
competing conclusions.301  On the other, the lock-in effect of strict adherence 
to prior decisions prioritizes the Supreme Court’s role in resolving the conflicts.  
By contrast, these features undermine intercircuit uniformity and make overall 
resolution of issues of national concern less efficient.302  
This connection between the law of the circuit doctrine and percolation also 
fits the structural history and context of the doctrine.  As discussed, the doctrine 
generally took hold as the Supreme Court transitioned to a discretionary 
caseload focused on maintaining uniformity and the courts of appeals gained 
greater independence over an increasingly large caseload.303  While I have not 
found any express connections between the two during this time, the law of the 
circuit doctrine’s effect of prioritizing the Supreme Court’s role as final arbiter 
of conflicts among the circuits, even as the courts of appeals remain the final 
word in most cases, reflects this structural shift.  No circuit’s decision is 
prioritized over the other, rather they each remain bound only to the views of 
 
298. See Vestal, supra note 82, at 134 (noting “the desirability of diversity so that a reviewing 
court would be able to consider all possibilities” as a reason given shortly after the Civil War for why 
circuit courts should not defer to other circuit court decisions on an issue). 
299. See Tiberi, supra note 243, at 884 (discussing Robert L. Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite 
A Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1953)).  But see Edward T. Roehner & Sheila M. Roehner, 
Certiorari-What is a Conflict Between Circuits?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 656, 657 (1953) (disputing Stern’s 
claim that the Court’s denials that term actually involved conflicts).  
300. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986) (“As petitioner has candidly conceded, 
various forms of the claim he now advances had been percolating in the lower courts for years at the 
time of his original appeal.”). 
301. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 288, at 698–99. 
302. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 39, at 568 (“intracircuit uniformity comes at the expense of 
intercircuit conflicts.”). 
303. See supra Part II. 
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the Supreme Court.  And no circuit can resolve a disagreement among them; 
they can only offer their thoughts and wait for the Supreme Court.  In this way, 
the doctrine reinforces the Supreme Court’s role as conflict-resolver, which was 
an express justification for the Court’s shift to a discretionary docket.  
However, the law of the circuit doctrine only allows percolation up to a 
point.  While percolation theory is largely focused on the Supreme Court, 
defenders of the approach also argue that it improves decisionmaking by 
allowing the circuits to converse and engage with each other.304  But the lock-
in effect of the doctrine works against these values by limiting each circuit’s 
engagement after that first decision, cutting short continuing discussion and 
debate among the circuits.  This lock-in effect also imposes structural costs 
we’ve noted.305  By supporting the Supreme Court’s primary yet inadequate 
role in resolving conflicts, the doctrine works to perpetuate conflicts and 
impose other costs associated with skewing the Supreme Court’s work towards 
conflicts.  Some of the most vocal criticisms of percolation as an approach to 
certiorari stem from these same concerns.306   
To sum, the law of the circuit doctrine’s role in enabling the Supreme 
Court’s percolation approach to certiorari is likely undervalued.  The doctrine’s 
contribution to percolation reflects a stronger fit between the doctrine’s history 
and operation than the uniformity or efficiency arguments more common in the 
literature.  But the doctrine’s role in percolation also highlights the doctrine’s 
vulnerability to the modern reality of conflicts.  The rule’s effect of closing off 
debate in the courts of appeals in favor of prioritizing the Supreme Court’s role 
in resolving conflicts both undermines a goal of percolation—developing the 
law through dialogue—and gives rise to one of the prime criticisms of 
percolation—that the percolation simply perpetuates conflicts and their costs.  
The doctrine’s role in percolation is therefore underappreciated both as a value 
and as an opportunity for reform.  Relaxing the doctrine in conflict cases could 
both better serve percolation’s goals—and arguably the doctrine’s goals—in 
two ways: first by better enabling development of the law through dialogue, 
and second by mitigating some of the impacts identified by percolation’s critics.   
 
304. See Gewirtzman, supra note 289, at 487. 
305. See supra Section II.B. 
306. See Gewirtzman, supra note 289, at 489–92 (noting critiques “arguing that percolation 
perpetuates ‘uncertainty and repetitive litigation’ by creating a lack of uniformity in federal law and 
thus undermining the legitimacy of the federal courts and potentially the Constitution itself.”) (quoting 
Frost, supra note 18, at 1582). 
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IV.  HOW CIRCUITS CAN FIX THEIR SPLITS 
This Part offers my proposal for relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine in 
conflict cases.  Section A explains the proposal and offers ways to adopt the 
proposal.  Section B lays out the proposal’s benefits, including structural 
benefits by reducing reliance on the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts and 
institutional benefits such as increased transparency and dialogue in appellate 
decisionmaking at a lower cost than other proposals seeking similar goals.  
Section C confronts the proposal’s potential tradeoffs—increased flexibility in 
exchange for less stability.  Section C therefore discusses two representative 
counterarguments stemming from potential instability created by the proposal: 
that the proposal will generally result in too much volatility in federal law, and 
that the proposal threatens specific doctrinal areas where stability is especially 
important, such as the need for clearly-established constitutional law.  I argue 
that, on balance, the benefits of the proposal outweigh these risks.  
A.  Relaxing the Law of the Circuit Doctrine in Conflict Cases  
My proposal is that the courts of appeals should relax the law of the circuit 
doctrine when a prior panel opinion has subsequently resulted in a conflict with 
another circuit.  Courts should relax the doctrine to allow the latter panel to 
revisit the prior decision and address the grounds for the conflict with another 
circuit.  
The proposal is narrow in three important ways.  First, I’m only advocating 
that the courts of appeals relax the doctrine in conflict cases; the existing strict 
rule could still apply in the vast majority of cases.  Second, I am not advocating 
that the latter panel must resolve a conflict; it could resolve the conflict, clarify 
that there is no conflict, or even maintain the conflict despite the competing 
arguments.  Any of these outcomes offer benefits over the status quo, as I argue 
below.  Third, the proposal does not change the hierarchical relationship 
between panels, the en banc court, or the Supreme Court.  A panel decision 
revisiting a prior decision because of a conflict could, for example, still be 
reheard en banc or heard by the Supreme Court.  The same accountability 
structures could apply; panels simply gain a tool to help address conflicts and, 
arguably, these accountability structures will be improved by reducing reliance 
on the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts.  
Let’s return to the conflict introduced earlier involving the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits to illustrate the proposal.307  In that example, the Sixth Circuit 
 
307. See supra pp. 1403–04.  
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issued a decision in 2000 pro se case that there is no implied right of action to 
enforce a provision of the Voting Rights Act.308  In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit 
subsequently split with the Sixth Circuit on this issue, arguing, among other 
things, that the Sixth Circuit had outright missed controlling precedents.309  In 
2016, a voting rights non-profit asked the Sixth Circuit to reconsider its prior 
decision in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s contrary decision.310  
This is where my proposal would kick in.  Rather than being bound to the 
prior panel decision, as the Sixth Circuit held, the Sixth Circuit could revisit the 
issue.  The Sixth Circuit could then consider the Eleventh Circuit’s reasons, 
including the precedents that the Eleventh Circuit found controlling.  The Sixth 
Circuit then has several options.  It could change position, align with the 
Eleventh Circuit, and resolve the conflict.  Or it could reject the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reasons and maintain the conflict.  Or it could explain, for whatever 
reason, that there is actually no conflict and that its prior decision remains 
controlling.  At best, the conflict is eliminated.  At worst, substantial uncertainty 
regarding the Sixth Circuit’s view is eliminated—the Sixth Circuit has 
confronted the precedents and reasons that persuaded the Eleventh Circuit, 
clarifying its dated position on the issue.  Even if the Sixth Circuit maintains 
the conflict, it has nevertheless contributed to further development of the issue 
by better articulating its position.311  
 
308. McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2000). 
309. Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
310. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 630 (6th Cir. 2016). 
311. In both editions of his book THE FEDERAL COURTS, Judge Posner expressed support for 
this proposal:  
[T]he proposition that a court of appeals should give somewhat less weight to the 
decisions other circuits than to its own decisions, in order to generate the 
competitive process that is a worthwhile feature of the circuit system, does not 
have any merit if there already is a conflict between circuits.  Suppose that in case 
1 the Third Circuit holds X; in case 2 the Fourth Circuit holds not X; and case 3 
now comes to the Third Circuit, and raises the same issue again.  I do not think 
the Third Circuit should take the position that stare decisis requires it to adhere 
to X notwithstanding the intervening decision of the Fourth Circuit, or even to 
presume the correctness of X.  On what basis could the Third Circuit think its 
earlier decision more authoritative than the Fourth Circuit’s contrary decision?  It 
ought to reexamine its previous decision conscientiously and without 
preconceptions.  This practice would not add too much uncertainty to the law of 
the circuit, since, whenever there is a conflict between two circuits, the law of 
both circuits is unstable because the Supreme Court is likely sooner or later to 
intervene.  
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This example helps clarify that the primary goal of the proposal is to change 
how the federal courts as a whole handle conflicts, not necessarily to eliminate 
conflicts.  As we’ve discussed, the current interaction between the law of the 
circuit and the Supreme Court’s approach to certiorari results serious structural 
costs on the federal courts.  While other proposals have suggested reforming 
the Supreme Court’s certiorari practice to address these problems, this proposal 
approaches the same goal—reducing reliance on the Supreme Court to resolve 
conflicts—from a different direction by reforming how the courts of appeals 
generate and perpetuate conflicts.  As I’ll explain below, the proposal has a co-
benefit of increasing overall capacity to resolve conflicts, and in particular the 
kind of low-stakes conflicts implicating a couple or few circuits that many 
commenters believe are not worth the effort of Supreme Court or en banc 
review.312  But the proposal does not, and is not intended to, guarantee an 
overall reduction in conflicts.  The goal is to adjust the roles of the federal courts 
regarding conflicts and thereby relieve bottlenecks that impose structural costs 
on the entire federal judiciary.    
Courts could relax the law of the circuit doctrine in conflict cases relatively 
easily by modifying their local rules.  One option is for courts modify the law 
of the circuit doctrine itself and create an exception to the rule for conflict cases.  
Courts could accomplish this either by modifying their rules to create an 
entirely new exception to the doctrine for conflict cases, or make use of the 
existing doctrinal exception by defining a “change in the law” sufficient to 
enable a panel to revisit a prior decision to include a conflict with another 
circuit.  A uniform federal rule is likely not necessary—even incremental 
adoption of the proposal across some of the circuits would offer benefits over 
the status quo.  
Another option would be to adopt an informal, mini-en banc procedure for 
revisiting panel decisions in conflict cases.313  Under this approach, the current 
 
POSNER, supra note 246, at 256; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGES 
AND REFORM 381 (2d ed. 1996) (nearly identical discussion).  
In his characteristic way, Posner does not elaborate on this idea further.  Nor has anyone else—
as far as I can tell, only one law review article has noted Posner’s input on this point, and does not 
discuss it at any length.  White, supra note 247, at 673 n.216 (“Judge Posner, however, has suggested 
relaxing the law of the circuit when a subsequent circuit rejects the prior circuit’s point of view,” adding 
without explanation that “Judge Posner is correct”).  
312. See infra Section IV.B.1.b. 
313. Cf. Baker, Alternative Futures, supra note 152, at 959 n.121 (“The Federal Courts Study 
Committee exhorted courts of appeals to resist creating intercircuit conflicts and suggested that a draft 
opinion that would create a conflict should first be circulated to the full court.”). 
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panel would be able to circulate the opinion revisiting the prior decision in a 
conflict case to the rest of the court for approval.  Assuming that such informal 
procedures are valid exercises of the en banc power, this option would not 
require modification of either the law of the circuit doctrine or the court’s rule: 
the en banc court would be revisiting the prior decision as allowed under the 
current doctrine, only the panel is doing most of the work.  A court could even 
adopt this option only for conflict cases.  Informal en banc procedures are 
controversial, and a court could limit potential negative effects of the practice 
by limiting its use to revisiting panel decisions that resulted in a conflict.314  
Both of these options could also be achieved by changing the circuit’s case 
law.  The law of the circuit doctrine is itself a creature of case law, which creates 
an odd problem of circularity: because the doctrine makes prior cases strictly 
binding, it would be impossible for a later panel to change the doctrine.315  
Changing the doctrine by modifying the circuit’s case law may therefore require 
an en banc proceeding, which seems both appropriate and worth the additional 
cost given the lasting benefits the change could have for future panels’ work.  
Some circuits have “adopted” informal mini-en banc procedures by simply 
using it in a panel decision and then citing back to that opinion as authority for 
the practice.316  So too could a court adopt this practice for conflict cases. 
B.  Benefits  
Relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine in conflict cases would offer many 
benefits at lower cost than other proposals.  This section discusses these benefits 
in two categories: benefits to overall structure of the federal courts, and benefits 
to the specific institution of the courts of appeals.  I then discuss the proposal’s 
low cost and ease of implementation, which I see as its distinguishing feature.  
While many proposals have targeted the structural and institutional benefits 
discussed below, relaxing the law of the circuit using tools already available to 
the courts of appeals offers a way of pursuing those benefits with substantially 
less disruption to the courts or other tradeoffs.  
 
314. See, e.g., Sloan, Stealth Procedures, supra note 39, at 768 (“These are all good points, but 
on balance, the better course of action is for the courts to resist using informal en banc review to 
overrule cases unless those cases have been directly invalidated by intervening superior authority.”). 
315. Mead, supra note 27, at 800 n.95 (“There is a circular nature to law of the circuit in those 
circuits which rely only on prior panel case law to establish it.  A case says that later panels are bound 
by earlier panels, but later panels are bound by that assertion only if they accept the premise that they 
are bound by that case.”). 
316. See, e.g., Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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1.  Structural Benefits 
Relaxing the law of the circuit to allow circuits to address conflicts offers 
two structural benefits that have long been pursued by advocates of reform in 
the federal courts: reduced reliance on the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts, 
and increased capacity to resolve conflicts. 
a.  Less Reliance on the Supreme Court  
As discussed, sole reliance on the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts has 
imposed serious costs on the federal judiciary, including opening the Supreme 
Court’s docket to capture and creating informational and accountability gaps 
between the Supreme Court and courts of appeals.317  These costs are associated 
with the Supreme Court’s role as conflict-resolver, and many proposals have 
focused on changing the Supreme Court itself to either accommodate that 
role,318 or to eliminate the Court’s role in reducing conflicts altogether.319  This 
proposal comes at the same goals indirectly, by enabling the courts of appeals 
to take on some responsibility, perhaps even primary responsibility, for 
resolving conflicts.  The Supreme Court could still exercise some role in 
resolving persistent conflicts among the courts of appeals, but conflicts 
generally could take on lesser importance in the Court’s overall docket.  
While less direct than other proposals, this approach offers a more realistic 
and incremental approach to addressing these problems.  In this way, the 
proposal is an important contribution linking the reforms in the lower federal 
courts with persistent debates about reforming the Supreme Court’s certiorari 
docket.  Approaching reform indirectly by addressing the source of conflicts 
that skew the Court’s certiorari docket offers a new perspective to these 
long-standing debates, and as discussed below, a realistic opportunity for 
reform in a discourse that has been dominated by creative but costly proposals.     
b.  Increased Capacity to Resolve Conflicts 
Relaxing the law of the circuit to allow the courts of appeals to address 
conflicts increases overall capacity for potentially resolving conflicts.  This 
Article has primarily focused on the negative effects of conflicts on the 
 
317. See supra Section II.B. 
318. See, e.g., George & Guthrie, supra note 158, at 1449–50 (proposing to restructure the 
Supreme Court to accommodate a large caseloads and, among other things, resolve more conflicts). 
319. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 148, at 863–64 (discussing the national court of appeals 
proposal).  
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Supreme Court’s relationship with the courts of appeals, and there is substantial 
debate about the negative effects of conflicts themselves.320  Nevertheless, 
allowing the courts of appeals to resolve conflicts on their own increases the 
overall number of decisionmakers available to address conflicts—more so than 
forcing the Supreme Court to decide more conflict cases or than creating a 
dedicated court or panel of existing Article III judges dedicated to conflicts.  
This is a potential co-benefit of the proposal alongside the benefits of reducing 
reliance on the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts.  While the Supreme Court 
could still resolve particularly severe disagreements among the circuits, this 
proposal would be well suited to resolving lower-stakes disagreements among 
a few or handful circuits—precisely the kind of conflicts that many critics 
suggest are not that important and not worth the extraordinary effort the federal 
appellate structure currently devotes to them.321  In this way, this proposal not 
only helps increase capacity to resolve conflicts, but increases capacity in the 
right place to help resolve the right kind of conflicts—those that impose the 
highest costs for the lowest payoff.  
2.  Institutional Benefits  
In addition to structural benefits offered by reducing overall reliance on the 
Supreme Court and increasing capacity for potentially resolving conflicts, 
relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine to address conflicts offers three benefits 
to the courts of appeals themselves.  These benefits can be broadly understood 
as improving the law-declaration function of the courts of appeals in conflict 
cases, where this function is particularly important, while maintaining the case-
management benefits of the strict law of the circuit doctrine, however limited, 
in the majority of cases.   
a.  Better Decisionmaking 
Allowing circuits to engage with each other in conflict cases may result in 
better decisions.  It returns to conflict cases an incremental, common-law 
approach to judicial decisionmaking that underlies the theory of percolation—
that repeated engagement with an issue over several sets of facts will yield 
better results.322  The federal courts’ role in declaring the law is particularly 
important among panels of the federal courts of appeals, where their decisions 
 
320. See Frost, supra note 18, at 1582–84 (laying out arguments in favor of uniformity). 
321. See id. at 1584–1606 (questioning the arguments in favor of uniformity).  
322. Gewirtzman, supra note 289, at 482–83. 
 
SASSMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2020  9:23 PM 
2020] HOW CIRCUITS CAN FIX THEIR SPLITS 1457 
   
 
create binding precedent and are the final word on most issues of federal law.323  
“Thus, it is exceedingly important,” as Amanda Frost put it, that panels on the 
federal courts of appeals “get decisions right.”324  Decisions that have 
subsequently resulted in a conflict with another circuit present at least a 
plausible concern that the initial decision is wrong, justifying the need to revisit 
the initial decision.  The result is greater confidence in the court of appeals’ 
decisionmaking, supporting percolation and the declarative function of the 
courts of appeals.  
This is perhaps my proposal’s primary advantage over a strict rule of 
intercircuit stare decisis—a competing proposal that the first panel of a court of 
appeals to address an issue binds all panels of all other circuits.325  Proposals 
for intercircuit stare decisis offer some similar benefits—namely, increased 
uniformity through reduced conflicts—but at the cost of dialogue across the 
multi-circuit system.326  Intercircuit stare decisis results in the first panel 
decision controlling all courts, undercutting percolation and inhibiting the 
declarative function of the courts.  My proposal, by contrast, maintains this 
value of the multi-circuit system and may therefore result in better decisions 
while still addressing the negative influence of conflicts.  
b.  Increased Transparency 
Relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine in conflict cases may also result in 
more candid judicial engagement with prior decisions and decisions from other 
circuits.  One common concern with the existing law of the circuit doctrine is 
that judges will disingenuously ignore or distinguish prior decisions that, 
though binding, they disagree with.327  Likewise, there is some concern that 
panels will use unpublished decisions to either avoid binding circuit precedent 
or manipulate conflicts.328  Or that strict adherence to the law of the circuit may 
result in circuits setting precedent without full awareness of relevant issues or 
 
323. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 512 (2009) [hereinafter 
Frost, Limits of Advocacy] (discussing the importance of law-declaration function in the federal courts 
of appeals). 
324. Id.   
325. See Dragich, supra note 39, at 583–84. 
326. Id. at 583. 
327. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 
865, 893–94 (2019) (noting that later “three-judge panels often repudiate principles articulated by 
earlier panels and confine those principles to the facts that gave rise to them.”).  
328. Thanks to Justin Marceau for this comment.  
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cases, such as the Sixth Circuit’s first decision in our Voting Rights Act 
example.329   
Allowing panels to revisit prior decisions that have resulted in a conflict 
with another circuit may help mitigate these problems.  While this proposal 
cannot guarantee judicial adherence to precedent in all cases, it may result in 
more candid engagement with prior decisions in conflict cases by enabling the 
latter panel to surface and express disagreement.  Likewise, panels would have 
less incentive to submerge disagreements with precedent or other circuits using 
unpublished decisions if they could openly engage with those decisions with 
confidence that it could be revisited in light of subsequent disagreements.  
Finally, the proposal would allow panels to confront information that the prior 
panel missed, whether inadvertently or not.  These benefits, thought limited to 
a narrow range of cases, may be of most benefit in conflict cases where 
reasoned engagement with contrary viewpoints is a core aspect of percolation 
and improving decisions through continued dialogue.  
c.  Uniformity, Efficiency, and Percolation  
Finally, the proposal balances increased attention to conflicts with the law 
of the circuit doctrine’s role in pursuing uniformity, efficiency, and 
percolation—and in some cases, the proposal improves the doctrine’s ability to 
achieve these values.  By limiting this proposal to conflict cases, the strict law 
of the circuit doctrine would still operate in the vast majority of cases.  Although 
the uniformity and efficiency benefits of the existing doctrine are likely thinner 
than the literature suggests, this proposal nevertheless maintains those benefits 
for most cases.  Rather, it targets a narrower set of conflicts that most clearly 
undermine values of uniformity.  By giving circuits the tools to address 
conflicts, the proposal helps better balance the tension in the existing doctrine 
between intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts.  Moreover, allowing circuits to 
engage with and resolve conflicts is consistent with the theory of percolation, 
removing an existing barrier in conflict cases to continued dialogue and 
development of an issue.  The proposal therefore maintains the upside, however 
limited, of the existing doctrine in most cases and helps mitigate some of the 
doctrine’s downside imposed by its role in generating and perpetuating 
conflicts.   
 
329. See also, generally, Frost, Limits of Advocacy, supra note 323 (arguing that it is appropriate 
for courts to raise issues not raised by parties). 
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3.  Lower Cost 
The distinguishing feature of this proposal is that it can be implemented at 
a lower cost than other proposals in three senses.  
a.  Lower Political Cost 
Relaxing the law of the circuit to address conflicts presents a lower political 
cost than other structural changes.  Most attempts to address the structural 
influences of the Supreme Court’s focus on conflicts have proposed changes to 
the fundamental structure of the federal courts.330  Ranging from restructuring 
certiorari to creating an entirely new tier of the federal judiciary, these proposals 
came with a high political cost that ultimately has never been surmounted.331  
Although the federal courts themselves continue changing, major reform to the 
judicial structure has become more difficult over time.  After the introduction 
of the courts of appeals, the federal courts have settled into a structure so 
entrenched that even the addition of circuits to accommodate the growing 
caseloads proved bitterly contentious and, ultimately, ineffective. 
Increased partisanship in and around the Supreme Court has made major 
reform of the Court more popular but also more politically fraught.332  Structural 
reforms themselves have taken on a partisan tinge after the appointment of 
Justice Kavanaugh and the shift of the Court to a solid conservative majority.333  
Both features, the increasingly settled structure of the federal courts and 
increasing political baggage associated with structural change, encourage using 
incremental reforms to address structural problems.  This proposal—focused 
on a targeted doctrinal change in the courts of appeals—avoids some of the 
political costs associated with prior proposals for structural change while 
serving some of the same goals.   
 
330. See, e.g., Carrington & Cramton, supra note 159, at 632; Comment, supra note 148, at 863–
64. 
331. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 159, at 636; Comment, supra note 148, at 885. 
332. See, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE 
L.J. 148, 150–52 (2019) (discussing the politicization of the Supreme Court and the potential reforms 
to it).   
333. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Frustrated Democrats Intensify Demand for Big Institutional 
Changes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/democrats-
filibuster-court-packing.html [https://perma.cc/NB2Q-9ABL]. 
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b.  Lower Institutional Cost 
Relaxing the law of the circuit as proposed here presents lower institutional 
costs than other proposals focused on the courts of appeals.  As the debate over 
citation to unpublished opinions illustrates, even incremental change to certain 
practices of the appellate courts can be seen as deeply threatening to the position 
of the courts of appeals in the increasingly lopsided federal judicial system.334  
Other proposals to address conflicts that are focused on the courts of appeals 
present more serious departures from the courts’ settled practices than this 
proposal.  Intercircuit stare decisis, for example, would eliminate the 
longstanding practice of circuit independence and further entrench a strict 
approach to prior decisions.335  By contrast, this proposal is targeted to maintain 
the existing law of the circuit doctrine for most cases, yet allow a continuing 
dialogue among circuits in conflict cases consistent with traditional incremental 
and discursive approaches to judicial decisionmaking.   
c.  Lower Implementation Cost 
Finally, this proposal makes use of existing tools already available among 
the circuits.  Unlike other proposals, this proposal does not require legislative 
change or Supreme Court intervention.  Likewise, it does not require uniform 
change across the circuits in one fell swoop.  Rather, it could be adopted through 
a change in each circuit’s local rules or case law, offering incremental benefits 
as each circuit adopts the proposal.  These features make for lower 
implementation costs than other proposals directed at similar problems.   
C.  Counterarguments 
The proposal nevertheless comes with potential tradeoffs; allowing greater 
flexibility in the courts of appeals’ decisionmaking can be seen as inviting 
greater volatility in federal law, and with that volatility, more gamesmanship 
by judges and lawyers, less certainty for litigants, and greater inefficiency 
overall.  These concerns resonate with the old saw that it is better for the law to 
be settled than right, which reflects one of the defining tensions in how courts 
treat their prior decisions.  This Section discusses two arguments that are 
illustrative of concerns that my proposal will result in too much instability.  The 
 
334. See Sloan, Pragmatic Approach, supra note 257, at 951 (arguing that her approach, though 
“advisable as a matter of policy, permissible under the Rules Enabling Act, and constitutional,” is not 
likely to be adopted because “the vehemence of the views on both sides on citation norms alone” makes 
“changes to FRAP 32.1 . . . insurmountable.”). 
335. Dragich, supra note 39, at 583–84.  
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first confronts the broad concern that my proposal will yield a kind of chaotic, 
constantly changing world ripe for confusion and manipulation.  The second 
argument is a specific application of that general concern, arguing that my 
proposal undermines specific doctrinal areas where stability is particularly 
important, such as the need for clearly-established law.  I argue that both 
concerns are exaggerated when compared to the status quo, and that the benefits 
of my proposal outweigh these concerns.   
1.  Volatility 
One concern with my proposal is that giving courts of appeals the ability to 
revisit prior decisions in conflict cases will result in a constantly changing law 
of the circuit, where issues are never fully settled and constantly revisited.  Two 
examples help illustrate this concern.  
First, consider a situation where an ideological minority on a circuit uses a 
conflict as an opportunity to undermine the position of a majority of the judges 
on the circuit.  While plausible, I don’t think this gamesmanship is a serious 
problem with my proposal for several reasons.  Implementing the proposal 
through a procedure that allows for input from other judges on the circuit, such 
as the informal, mini-en banc procedure, would avoid this problem outright.  
And even if the proposal was implemented through a different procedure, full 
rehearing en banc would still be available to police minority views.  But even 
assuming the proposal is implemented in a way to allow this outcome and 
traditional en banc procedures are not available, I still don’t think this is a 
problem with the proposal itself.  Rather, it’s a problem inherent with using 
panels to make decisions for the full court.  And even if it is a problem with the 
proposal, relaxing the law of circuit in conflict cases at least narrows this risk 
to a small minority of cases, maintaining the normal function of the law of the 
circuit in most cases.  
The second illustration concerns too much dialogue.  Imagine the Sixth 
Circuit rules on an issue.  The Eleventh Circuit then splits with the Sixth Circuit.  
The Sixth Circuit revisits the issue, but in the meantime the Fourth Circuit splits 
with the Eleventh Circuit, siding with the Sixth Circuit’s initial decision.  But 
now the Sixth Circuit has changed, so a third panel then revisits the second 
panel’s decision, reinstating the Sixth Circuit’s initial position.  The Eleventh 
Circuit then revisits its initial decision in light of the split with the Fourth 
Circuit, and so on.  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court wants to grant certiorari, 
but the circuits positions keep changing.  How can the Supreme Court know 
what the law is?  How can lawyers advise their clients? 
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There are several points in response.  First, it’s unlikely that federal 
litigation moves this quickly in all but the most pressing issues, such as the 
same-sex marriage litigation, or perhaps particularly common issues, such 
criminal sentencing issues.  A situation like this would be the exception, not the 
rule.  Second, it would still be fairly clear what the controlling law of each 
circuit is under my proposal even in the midst of such dialogue.  Under my 
proposal, the law of the circuit remains what the latest panel said it is.  It would 
be no more difficult for district courts or lawyers to know what the controlling 
law is than under the status quo, where potential change is always possible, just 
limited to a smaller set of actors (a legislature, Supreme Court, or en banc 
court).  My proposal might make such a change more frequent, but no less 
discernable as a matter of finding what the controlling law is.  Third, an issue 
need not be settled in every circuit to be taken up by the Supreme Court and 
settled nationwide.  Many issues are resolved without having every circuit 
weigh in, and there can be value in the Supreme Court resolving a major issue 
even while it is still percolating.  Plus, hypotheticals like this—where courts are 
engaged in too much dialogue—would better highlight issues for Supreme 
Court resolution than the current regime of several circuits each offering a 
one-time take.  Examples of repeated disagreement more clearly signals a need 
for Supreme Court resolution, and the Supreme Court arguably has a wider 
diversity of views to consider.   
All told, it is likely that my proposal will yield more change generally in 
the law of the circuit.  But it’s not clear that such change will result in more 
gamesmanship, less clear law in each circuit, or undermine Supreme Court 
review. 
2.  Clearly-Established Law 
Another concern is that, even if increased volatility in general is not that 
bad, there are specific doctrinal areas where stability is particularly important, 
such as the need for clearly-established rights in constitutional adjudication.  
For example, state actors who hurt people are generally protected from civil 
claims by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can prove that the state actor 
violated the person’s constitutional or statutory rights under clearly-established 
law.336  Often, an on-point panel opinion from the relevant court of appeals is 
 
336. See, e.g., Tenorio v. Pitzer, 802 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The doctrine of qualified 
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
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sufficient to demonstrate that a right is clearly-established.337  My proposal, one 
might argue, harms plaintiffs’ ability to seek redress of constitutional injuries 
by undermining the concept that a panel opinion “clearly establishes” a right.  
Rather, the argument goes, any panel opinion is subject to revision and 
therefore cannot clearly establish anything.338     
This argument is misplaced and reveals a helpful distinction.  As noted 
above, my proposal does not make it any more difficult to discern what the 
controlling law of the jurisdiction is.  If the District of Colorado must determine 
whether the Tenth Circuit has recognized a particular right before in a 
precedential decision, my proposal doesn’t make it any more difficult to figure 
that out.  Rather, the argument seems to be motivated by a concern that my 
proposal will undermine the established-ness of the Tenth Circuit’s 
precedential panel decision.  But whether a right is clearly-established is a 
doctrinal fiction unrelated to how a decision can change and when.  That the 
Tenth Circuit’s precedential panel decision can be changed by the Tenth Circuit 
en banc or the Supreme Court does not, for example, affect a rights 
established-ness, just as precedential decisions from other circuits do not affect 
established-ness in the Tenth Circuit.  Both the law of the circuit and the 
concept of clearly-established law are distinct legal fictions designed for 
different purposes.  The two can coexist—the courts of appeals could maintain 
the existing rule that a precedential panel decision clearly establishes a 
constitutional right in the circuit, or any other doctrinal feature that requires 
special attention to stability, even if they adopted my proposal. 339   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Debate over reforms to address the structural influence of conflicts on the 
federal courts have long focused on the Supreme Court, and long preferred 
dramatic proposals to fundamentally change the courts and how they work.  
This debate has largely overlooked targeted, incremental changes in how the 
courts of appeals generate and perpetuate conflicts as a potential avenue for 
addressing these same problems.  Viewed in context, the courts of appeals 
 
337. See id. at 1063–64 (“Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be 
a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from 
other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.”) (quoting Becker v. Bateman, 
709 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 2013)). 
338. I want to thank Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin, and Nancy Leong for this point. 
339. Notably the concept of clearly-established law has been adjusted to accommodate other 
reforms in judicial administration.  See Lauren Staley, Inadequate and Ineffective?  Factual Innocence 
and the Savings Clause of § 2255, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1157 (2013). 
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developed the law of the circuit doctrine in response to their own increasing 
independence as the Supreme Court transitioned to a court of discretionary 
review focused on maintaining uniformity.  While the doctrine serves several 
purposes, the doctrine’s role in propping up the Supreme Court as the primary 
court responsible for resolving conflicts closely matches this historical 
compromise.  And as modern realities of federal caseloads have stressed the 
Court’s role in resolving conflicts, the doctrine works to exacerbate the negative 
effects of conflicts.  Reforming the law of the circuit doctrine itself therefore 
offers a narrowly-tailored and realistic opportunity for change to address these 
issues, while empowering the courts of appeals to further develop federal law 
through continued dialogue. 
 
